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PREFACE
The thesis is a historico-philosophic survey of infinite 
processes in Greek mathematics* Beginning with the first 
emergence, in Ionian speculative cosmogony, of the tinder lying 
concepts of infinity, continuity, infinitesimal and limit, the 
survey follows the development of infinite processes through 
the ages as these concepts gain in clarity, -it notes the 
positive contributions of various schools of thought, the 
negative and corrective influences of others and, in a broad 
way, establishes the causal chain that finally led to the more 
abstract processes of the mathematical schools of Cnidus 
(Eudoxus) and Syracuse (Ardhimedes) •
At various stages of the survey important mathematical 
principles and axiosas are singled out for fuller discussion* 
Where these are detected for the first time in this thesis a 
full analysis is given; obscurities are cleared up, appraisals 
offered and comparisons with modem equivalents made* Where 
the discovery is not new, current opinions are reviewed and 
weighed and, where it has been thought necessary, counter 
opinions are offered*
The central figures in the evolution surveyed in these 
pages turn out to be Thales, Pythagoras, Zeno, Aristotle, 
Eudoxus and Archimedes; they are not all of equal importance 
but each is —  some as individuals, others only as typifying 
leading schools of thought —  an indispensable link in the 
chain established*
101497
What the author considers original and, mathematically, 
most important in this thesis is the full analysis of the 
Method of Exhaustion he presents. For the first time, to the 
best of his knowledge,
a) the Eudoxian number system in which this method operates is fully analysed,
b) the dependence of the method on this number system is established,
o) its essential difference from the modem integral calculus made clear, and
d) its two->fold aspect (as method of proof and method of discovery) revealed*
Other original, but minor, contributions, scattered through 
the various parts of the survey are new interpretations, 
explanations, derivations, proofs and comments* Wherever these 
occur throughout the text, if not explicitly attributed to 
others, they are held to be original*
Finally, the author acknowledges, with thanks, his 
indebtedness to Dr* Tobias Dantzig, under whose direction this 
survey was undertaken, for help received in the selection of 
titles and the organization of the material. Subjects which, 
though relevant to the survey, were thought too tedious to 
present in detail in the body of the thesis, and subjects 
which, though interesting, were not considered necessary to the 
main purpose of the survey have been consigned to the end, as 
appendixes I - 17•
University of Maryland 
College Park, Maryland Tune, 1942*
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CHAPTER I
ffiE method of limits
This survey begins, properly, with the Ionian School of 
philosophy« For in this school, especially in the cosmologies 
developed by its various members, we first find, with great 
lack of explieitness, it is true, and always vaguely and 
uncertainly, the basic concepts of infinity, the infinitesimal, 
limit and continuity emerging*
Thales of Miletus (640-546 B*G*)* From Information 
gathered from Proclus, Diogenes Laertius and other early 
historiographers and commentators, G-* J. Allman^ deduces that 
Thales, among his other achievements, had also formed the 
important mathematical conception of the geometric locus* He 
shows that Thales knew that:
1) A triangle is determined if its base and base angles are given,
Z) If the base and the sum of the base angles of a triangle are given then an unlimited number of triangles exist satisfying the given conditions,
5) The vertices of all such triangles lie on the circumference of a circle.
This constitutes one of the earliest examples of an
1 G««T# Allman, Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid 
Dublin, 1839, p* 13.
2
infinity of entities being looked upon as one distinguishable 
whole; it is also one of the earliest examples of a judgment 
being made about every member of an infinite set. We shall 
soon find the validity of such judgments being challenged.
Anaximander of Miletus (611-547). Paul Tannery recon­
structs Anaximander* s cosmogony from fragments preserved by 
various early writers and finds that it is based on the 
following three assumptions:
1) The sky rotates daily around the earth,
2) In a circular movement the heavy tends toward the center, the light away from the center,
3) Heat is connected with motion, cold with immobility.
In this theory, from an endless, unlimited and shapeless
7tmass, the octree^ 0  v  $ which is subject to a circular movement, 
a flat disc, the earth, is formed at the center; then rings of 
water, air and fire (the other three elements) are thrown out, 
spreading away from the center in ever thinning layers but 
not without limit, for an infinite mass cannot rotate. The 
universe thus formed, however, is not stable; the celestial 
fire devours and dissipates the center and the outflung layers 
and thus, in the course of time, everything returns to the 
original state. But there is an end to every period of dissi­
pation too, and the same reason that formed the universe once, 
reforms it. There is thus an endless succession of worlds in 
time and the only thing that remains immortal and imperishable 
is the circular movement.
& Paul Tannery, Pour lfhistoire de la science hellene » chapter on Anaximandre, Paris, 1950.
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Tannery thinks that the word 01 / as used in this
context must not be taken in its customary sense (^-privative
+ frdjOoif , end) as this is inconsistent with Anaximander*s
view concerning rotation of an infinite mass. The word, he
thinks, may very well be derived from (experience),
and the privative c* , in which case the meaning of the neuter 
>/■noun, +  f t *  L f  0 *  , would be "that which is not experienced"
both the active and the passive senses being permissible, that 
is, the word may mean not only "that which is not sensed" but 
also "that whieh does not sense". Hence, since the meaning
7/"infinite" conflicts with the theory, the <*■ rr etjo  e v  of 
Anaximander may well be nothing else but the air, immobile, 
invisible, odorless, and so on, and thus unperceived by any of 
the senses* It is then a plenum devoid of all qualities or 
attributes perceptible by the senses, and thus "an indeterminate 
plenum"•
Plausible though Tannery* s interpretation is it must be 
rejected; for we have the following statement, attributed by 
Simplicius0 to Theophrastus.
Among those who admit only one principle, mobile, but infinite, Anaximander, son of Praxiades of 
Hiletus, who was a disciple and successor of Thales, s’ays that the infinite is the principle and element of beings; besides, he is the on^ who first intro­duced the word principle ( ), meaning by
this word not water or some other of the elements that we know of, but *..*••••.
in which it is clearly stated that, whatever this rr te n e ts
May be, it is not any of the four elements (earth, water, air,
fire). Further, we shall see, when we take up Aristotle*s
® Simplicius, Physics* 6 a, Vors. 15:21-34
4
Ystudy of the infinite, that he examined this ocrr&t under 
# /the guise of rejected it as impossible,
4Armiriinenes of Miletus , a younger contemporary of 
Anaximander and, by report, a pupil and friend of his, added 
the elaboration that the boundless air, subject to an eternal 
movement, is the source of everything* Expanding under the 
influence of heat, or contracting under that of cold, it has 
foxmed all the phases of existence,
RAnaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428 B,C*) seems to have 
considered a chaotic mass, existing in some way from the 
beginning, and containing within it, in inf ini t esimally small 
fragments, endless in number, the seeds of things. These 
parts, of like nature with their wholes (the 01 of
Aristotle which, as we shall see, were the basis of his con­
ception of the continuous) were arranged, the like being 
segregated from the unlike, and summend into totals of like 
nature by the action of Mind ( v o v j ), whose first manifes­
tation in the universe was Motion, Anaxagoras held the 
evidence of the senses in slight esteem; for, though we seem 
to see things come into being and pass away, reflection (the 
uoxjj ) tells us that death and growth are but new aggre­
gations of the minute particles. It is easy to see in this 
philosophy the beginning of Atomism, the theory propounded by
4 F,W,A, Mullach, Fragments Phil, &rae,« i, 237-252
Ibid
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Leucippus (circ. 480 B,C,), pupil of Zeno, in this 
theory, an infinite empty space, and an infinity of atoms 
( ^ ~c~ *  = indivisibles) are the ultimate constituents
of all things. His pupil and friend,
Democritus of Abdera (circ, 460 B,C«), developed further 
the philosophy of his teacher and, .apparently, applied it to 
geometry. For, in the letter to Eratosthenes prefixed to 
"The Method" of Archimedes we find the following statement.
This is a reason why, in the case of the theorems the proof of which Eudoxus was the first to discover, namely, that the cone is a third part of the cylinder, and the pyramid of the prism, having the same base and equal height, we should 
give no small share of the credit to Democritus who was the first to make the assertion with regard to the said figure though he did not prove it.
Again, Plutarch7 presents Democritus as saying:
If a cone were cut by planes parallel to its base, what must we think of the surfaces of the sections, that they are equal or unequal? For, if they are unequal, they will show the cone to be irregular, as having many indentations like steps, and unevennesses; and if they are equal, the sections will be equal and the cone will appear to have the property of a cylinder, namely, to be composed of equal and not unequal circles, which is very absurd.
Whether this is an argument in support of Atomism —  for
it seems to say that the indentations must be taken as
existing (but small enough to be invisible) for otherwise
8there would be an absurd result —  or, as Cajori thinks, 
that it advances the view that matter is divisible to only a 
finite number of parts, one thing stands out clearly, it is
€ T«L« Heath, The Method of Archimedes, Cambridge, 1912
7 Plutarch, De Comm, Not,, Vol, IF, ed. Didot, p, 1321
Q Florlan Cajori, American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 22,
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a distinet foreshadowing of the "Method of Indivisibles*. 
Heath9 is so much of this opinion that he even suggests a 
method of proof as probably the one used by Democritus.
Two triangular pyramids with equal bases and equal 
heights, cat by a plane parallel to the bases and dividing 
the heights in some ratio give equal sections; hence the 
pyramids, thought of as consisting of thin laminae, are equal. 
This would be an anticipation of Gavalierits theorem. 
Democritus would then see that the pyramids into which a prism 
of the same base and height as the original pyramid can be 
divided satisfy this test of equality, so that the pyramid 
would be one third part of the prism. The extension to 
pyramids with polygonal bases would then be made by dividing 
the polygonal base into triangles* Finally, the extension 
to the cone might have been made, of course, without rigorous 
proof, by increasing indefinitely the number of sides of a 
regular polygonal base.




One of the well-known practices of Pythagoras and his 
school was that of ^  *  > or "representing
numbers by figures". This practice was, of course, a conse­
quence of the Pythagorean doctrine. For, in this doctrine, 
the geometric point was defined as "unity in position"
f ( o/
{ fe e l/* / &e<r/v eynxrrt) and, conversely, the unit of number as 
"a point without position" ( r - r t f f t y o t f f e T a f )10# Hence the 
natural tendency of representing numbers (pluralities of 
units) by aggregates of points, arranged in such shapes as the 
nature of the numbers might suggest.
In this practice a method was developed for the suc­
cessive generation of numbers of a given type; this was the 
use of gnomons11. Thus, Proclus, Diogenes Laertius and 
Plutarch attribute18 to Pythagoras the method of forming 
successive squares by the addition of equilateral gnomons
# # -  •  •
0 0 0 0  0 m  0 *  0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 *  »  •  *  '
0 0 * 0 0 + 0 0 *  0 0 0 0 0
• * * * 0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0
IQ Proclus, Comment, on Euclid I. ed. Friedlein, 1875, p.95
11 yv&fca?j; ( jfv&vcx. c 9 to know) ;= one who knows, that 
by which something is known, a criterion. In geometry: thefigure (like a carpenter!s square) which, added to any parallelogram, preserves the original shape (Euc. II, Def.2). 
More generally, the figure which, added to any figure, 
preserves the original shape (Heron of Alex., Def. 59).
18 Proclus, op. cit.« Diog. Laert., ed. Hubner,
Leipsic, VIII, 11.; Plutarch, Symposium. 6
8
while Lucian*'3 and Aristotle mention the formation, by the 
Pythagoreans, of the triangular and the oblong numbers
) by the addition of the
corresponding gnomons*
* •  » « ■ »
*  *  * 0 0  0 0 0 m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Another Pythagorean discovery of interest in this survey
is that of what are now known as Pythagorean numbers, that is,
2. 22 2 *| anumbers which satisfy the equation x -f- y ~ z* Proclusx
says:
But there are delivered certain methods of finding triangles of this kind (sc* right-angled 
triangles whose sides ean be expressed by whole numbers) one of which they refer to Plato, but the other to Pythagoras, as originating from odd numbers* For Pythagoras places a given odd number as the lesser of the sides about the right angle, and when he has taken the square erected on it, and diminished it by unity, he places half the remainder as the greater of the sides about the right angle; and when he has added unity to this he gets the hypotenuse* Thus, for example, •••*•• But the Platonic method originates from even numbers* For when he has taken a given even number he places it as one of the sides about the right angle, and when he has divided this into half, and squared the half, by adding unity to this square he gets the hypotenuse, but by subtracting unity from the 
square he foims the remaining side about the right 
angle*
The exact manner in which Pythagoras made this discovery 
is not known; Allman, however, makes the following plausible
IS ,Lucian, /s * ~ * 4 vol. i, p. 517, ed*
Jacobitz
14 Proclus, on* cit*, p*428
9
15suggestion . The recurrence formula in the formation of the
z 2successive squares is n, + (2n, + 1) * , in which 2n( •+• 1
is the number of units in the gnomon added to the square nf •
2It is easily seen that if 2n, + 1 = 1c , where k is any odd 
number (not 1), then the recurrence formula becomes n? + k* = n 
and thus the numbers n, , k, n 2 are a solution of the Pytha­
gorean triangle. The numbers n, and nz are, respectively,
" g ~  9 - It is possible, of course, that Plato9s rale
also may have had such an origin. For two successive gnomons
may have a sum which is a perfect square, that is
Z 2(2n - 1) h- (2n 1) = m , m  even, in which case n a (m/2) ,
which gives Plato9s rule.
The higher polygonal numbers, though not definitely 
attributed to Pythagoras, were yet studied with a good deal 
of thoroughness by his later followers. A full account of 
these is given by Nicamachus of Gerasa-**6 and by Theon of 
Smyrna*’7. The latter of these two later Pythagoreans (early 
part of seeond century A.D.) is important in this survey 
because of his famous algorithm on the ” side and diagonal” 
numbers (thus named by Heath). It is enough to state here —  
the matter will be discussed fully in a subsequent chapter —  
that in his book ”0n the mathematics useful in the reading of 
Plato”, in order to support his typically Pythagorean 
contention that
G.J. Allman, Enc. Brit.. Werner Ed., New York, 1900
16 Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic. Tr. 
M.L. Df0oge, Ann Arbor, 1938




as unity is the principle of all figures, according to the highest and generating ratio, so also is the ratio of the diagonal to the side found in the unit
he created an algorithm for the construction of a succession




An infinite process of a different kind is involved in
the solution of another problem attributed to Pythagoras.
Proclus^*8 ascribes the discovery of the incommensurables to
him but, unfortunately, does not give the method of discovery.
It is commonly assumed now that the discovery was effected
through the isosceles right-angled triangle. But the nature
19of this old proof (twice mentioned by Aristotle , and pre­
sented in some editions of Euclid as Prop. 117, Book X20),
21makes it more probable. Allman thinks , that this was 
accomplished by Pythagoras* successors. This proof is given 
by Heath in the following form.
C Let Ag = , eJL relatively prime.
Then, M  = -i 
AB / *
Z Z T-But since AC = 2 AB we have ot Z /2
aHence M is even, whence W. also is 
Q  even; now,^# is prime to ; hence 
must be odd.
Again, since of is even, let c( ~ 2^/. Then,
/?
18 Proclus, op. cit., p. 65
19 Prior Analytics, I, C, XXIII and I, S, XUV. ed. Bekker
20 Rejected by both Heath and Heiberg as an interpolation.




%and thus , *Bdience/3  also, is even. But/3  was shown to be 
odd.
Allman considers it more likely that the discovery was
made by Pythagoras through the problem of cutting a line in
extreme and mean ratio. This problem was solved by Pythagoras
by the method known as “application of areas”, a method
presented in Euclid (Book YI) and definitely ascribed by 
22Eudemus to Pythagoras.
How, from the solution of this problem it follows that if 
on the greater segment of a line so cut a part be taken equal 
to the less, the greater segment, regarded as a new line, will 
be cut in a similar manner; thus the process can be continued 
without end. On the other hand if a similar method were 
adopted in the case of any two lines which were capable of 
numerical representation (the less always being subtracted 
from the greater) the process would end. Hence would arise 
the distinction between commensurable and incommensurable lines.
Allman1 s theory is plausible; but there is evidence in 
Euclid to establish its soundness. We are told by Heath 
that "the substance of Books YTI-IX goes back at least to 
the Pythagoreans"; we can take the following definition and 
theorem then as being due at least to the Pythagoreans if not 
to Pythagoras.
22 Proclus, op.clt., p. 65
25 T.L. Heath, History of Greek Mathematics, 2:294
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(A) Bk, VII, Def, 4, "Numbers composite to one another arethose which are measured by some number as a common measure”*
(B) Bk* VII, Prop* 1* "Two unequal numbers being set out, and
the less being continually subtracted from the greater, if the number which is left never measures the one before it until a unit is left, the original numbers will be prime to one another” •
A £ $ 8  c f- 2> £-
Let the numbers be IB and CD, with AB greater than CD, Subtract CD repeatedly from AB until EB, less than CD, is left.
Subtract EB repeatedly from CD until FD, less than EB, is left; continue this process until a unit, qb. 
is left, I say AB, CD are prime to each other*
For, if not, let E, greater than a unit, measure them both. Then, since E measures CD, it measures AE; but it also measures AB; hence it measures EB,
Again, since E measures EB, it measures CF; but it also measures CD; hence it measures FD,
Again, since E measures FD* it measures EC; but it also measures EB; hence it measures the unit CrB, the greater the less, which is impossible.
Therefore, etc.
We note that in this proof lines are used to represent 
numbers, and hence the unit also. But how long a line must 
be taken to represent the unit? This question must have been 
faced and the conclusion easily arrived at that, even in the 
case where the two lines were not representations of whole 
numbers, but "part, or parts" the one of the other, or, as 
we would say, the one a rational fraction of the other, the 
length of the unit that measured them both did not matter; 
so long as a length was found, no matter how small, that made
14
the process end then the lines were commensurable * Hence would 
arise the questions: hut what if, no matter how small a line 
were found, at any given step, it never measured the one before 
it? Are there lines for which this process would never come 
to an end? And if there are such lines, how would one ever 
put them to the test since, obviously, no one can perform an 
infinity of operations?
At this point the known property of the "golden section" 
would come to Blind and supply the answers to these questions: 
Apply this same proeess to the segments AB, BC of the line AC, 
divided in extreme and mean ratio at B,
fi___________ 8 B_____ £  c
and you can be sure, beforehand* that the process will never 
come to an end* Hence, there exist incommensurable lines*
I offer now, for purposes of comparison, the definition 
(C) and the theorem (D) below; their similarity to the set 
(A) and (B) above, in ideas involved, wording and method of 
proof are too striking to miss*
(C) Bk* X, Def* 1* "Those magnitudes are said to becommensurable which are measured by the same measure*
(D) Bk# X, Prop* 2. "If, when the less of two unequalmagnitudes is continually subtracted in turn from the greater, that which 
is left never measures the one before it, the magnitudes wiU be incom­
mensurable" ,
15
Let AB, CD be the given magnitudes, with AB less than CD, and let AB be repeatedly subtracted 
from CD until FD, less than itself, is left#
Let ID be repeatedly subtracted from AB until CrB, less than itself, is left, and let this be continued indefinitely, with the remainder never 
measuring the one before it# i say AB, CD are 
incommensurable •
For, suppose some magnitude, E, measures them both# Then, since E measures AB it will measure CF, 
and since it also measures CD it will measure FD*
Again, since it measures FD it will measure AG and, since it also measures AB, it will measure GB#
Let this be continued until a magnitude BD isreached   Bk X, 1 less than E# Since Emeasures CH and CD it also measures HD, the greater the less, which is impossible# Therefore, etc#
The strict correspondence of (C), (D) to (A), (B) is 
apparent; it points unmistakably to a derivation of the 




We note in the derivation, and proof of the existence of 
the incommensurables just given, the first appearance of an 
important mathematical principle, intimately connected with 
the concept of infinity, namely, the principle of mathematical 
induction*
It was stated above that if Euclid's process were applied 
to the two segments of the "golden section" the process would 
not come to an end* It was pointed out that this was due to 
the fact that these two segments are such that there is as­
surance, beforehand, that after any step of the process,
another was possible* For, let a, b, be the large and small
segments of this section, respectively; then
£-±  JS - % . whencea v *
ab -»* ba = a* , or 
b* = a* — ab, and thus
which shows that b and a — b are themselves the large and 
small segments, respectively, of a "golden section". But b
a — b are also the next two segments in Euclid's algorithm* 
Hence, since b does not measure a neither does a — b measure 
b and thus the process is endless*
17
There are two more matters in the above theory to be 
pointed out and appraised in which the principle of mathematical 
induction is —  as in so many things in mathematics —  involved; 
hence, for the clarification of what is to follow a more 
detailed discussion of this principle is advisable.
This principle may be stated, in the abstract, in the 
following way:
Let 8 be a discrete series having the first term s,; let P be a property such that if any term,
(1) s, of S has the property P then the successor of s(if s has a successor) also has it. Then if s0has the property P every term of S has it.
Consider now the discrete series whose terms are the 
successive pairs of line segments produced from an initial 
pair, (a0, b0), by Euclid*s algorithm. This algorithm yields, 
from any term (a,b), its successor, (b, a - mb), provided b 
is not a measure of a; otherwise there is no successor and 
the series ends with (a,b)«
How let the first term, (a,, b„), consist of the pair of
segments a„, b*, of the "golden section" and let (a,b) be any
other term of the series. If a,b are the segments of a 
"golden section" we know, from the nature of this section, 
that b does not measure a, that Euclid1 s algorithm ( in which 
m is 1 now) yields the successor (b, a - b) and that this 
successor is itself a "golden section". But the first term,
(a0, bo), possesses this property (i,e,, is a "golden 
section"); hence, every term of the series possesses this 
property.
18
It is seen that the principle, as stated, is applicable 
to all series in which every term (with the exception of the 
last, if there is a last) has a successor* Its great useful­
ness, however, occurs in series in which every term does have 
a successor; in such a case the principle makes it possible 
to make assertions concerning every term of the series* with­
out enumeration of the individual terms (an operation which 
is, of course, impossible); such a case was the one met with 
in the derivation of the incommensurables given above*
A similar use of this principle, though somewhat more 
difficult to see, is involved in the definition of the finite 
cardinal numbers and hence, indirectly, of the infinite ones 
also, as conceived by G* Cantor , G* Peano and B* Bussell * 
If we seek some property, present in every term of the 
series
(S) 1, 2, 3, •••*••* n, «••«*•
and in no other number, to use as a defining property of 
these numbers, we are tempted to seize on the fact that these 
numbers are all derivable from 1 by successive additions of 
one* But then, how many successive additions are to be 
permitted? A finite or an infinite number? If the former, 
then some finite numbers will be left out by the definition, 
which is not what we want; if the latter, then some number 
of (S) will be infinite, which is not what we want either*
G* Cantor, Math* Annal*, 1885, VolsXLVI, or transl* by P*E*B* Jourdain, The Theory of Transfinite Numbers* Chicago,
1 9 1 5 -25 G* Peano, Formulaire de Mathematiques* Turin, 189526 B* Bussell, Principles of Mathematics, New York, 1958, 
or Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy« New York, 1925
19
Besides, we must not use the notions of finite and infinite 
anyway, for otherwise our definition becomes circular.
We try to sidestep this difficulty by the use of another 
word and define the finite numbers, as some actually do in 
popular language, as those that can be reached, from 1, by 
successive additions of one* But then, what does the word 
"reached" mean in mathematics? If it means "actually arrived 
at" by counting, or some other such process, then most of the 
finite numbers will have to be left out, for a very small 
part of them can be so arrived at. If, on the other hand, 
only "conceptually arrived at" is meant, then the difficulties 
are increased, not lessened. For, what is the criterion of 
conceptual accessibility? Some people have no difficulty in 
arriving, in some way, at the infinite itself, conceptually.
As a last resort we try the statement: The finite numbers
are the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. without end. But we 
soon realize that this only begs the question; for we have 
started out to define the series (S), and that is precisely 
what this series says, namely, 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on, without 
end.
The feeling persists however (as it should, of course) 
that the finite numbers are a perfectly definite class and 
that therefore some satisfactory way of defining them exists.
A way does exist.
We recall the definition of the principle of mathematical 
induction (given as (I) above) and in it we put (S) for S, 1
2®
for vS<ir, n for s and n + 1 for "successor of s"; we obtain:
Let (S) be a discrete series having the first term 1; let P be a property such that if any term, n, of (S) has the property P then n + 1 also has it* Then, if 1 has the property P every term of (S} has it*
We observe now that if P is the property of being 
"finite", as the word is intuitively understood, then the 
principle of mathematical induction asserts that all the terns 
of (S) are finite; for, clearly, 1 is finite, and n f  1 is 
finite if n is. Hence, we may define the finite numbers thus:
The finite numbers are all those numbers which possess every property possessed by 1 which is such 
that n +  1 possesses it if n does*
This definition will be recognized, of course, as
goessentially that of B* Bussell’s ; it merely states, in 
precise language, what is only vaguely expressed by the usual 
popular phrases* Thus, by the use of the principle of mathe­
matical induction, the difficulty of comprehending an 
infinity of objects within the scope of a single judgment has 
been overcome* This question will reappear in this survey*
The other matter that was to be pointed out is the 
appearance, for the first time, of still another principle of 
importance in mathematics, to wit, the principle of "infinite 
descent"^®* This principle may be stated, in the abstract,
23? Principles of Mathematics* Chap* X IV , or Introduction 
to Mathematical philosophy, chap* III*




When in a repeated process which begins with 
a finite number, each step of the process yields a number which is smaller than the one obtained in the previous step, the process comes to an end*
An examination of Euclid’s algorithm (given as prop* 1,
Book VII above) reveals that this principle is tacitly
invoked in it; for it is assumed that the process will, some
time, lead to the unit, at which it stops* Tacitly again
29this principle was used later by Giovanni Campano (c*1260)
30in proving the irrationality of the "golden section"* Fermat
(1601-1665) made the first explicit use of this principle;
by combining it with the law of contradiction he converted it
into a powerful method for the proof of theorems in the theory
of numbers* Thus, by its use, he proved that the area of a
Pythagorean triangle is never a square; the assumption that
such an area is a square leads to the result that there
exists another Pythagorean triangle, smaller than the first,
whose area is also a square, whence an infinite sequence of
such triangles, each smaller than the one before it, which
contradicts the principle in question, Fermat called his
51method of proof "la descents infinie ou indefinie" * This 
method was used by Legendre (with acknowledgment of indebted­
ness to Fexmat) in his^ssai sur la theorie des nomhres" in 
the proof of a great number of theorems.
29 Cajori, on*eit*. p, 142
30 A*M* Legendre, Kssai sur la theorie des nombres.
Paris, 1808
31 Cajori, oi>*cit** p. 169
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It will be seen, of course, that this method of proof is 
not a principle in the same sense in which mathematical 
induction is a principle, that is, it is not an independent, 
first truth, accepted without proof (no matter how it may hare 
been looked upon by its earlier users). It can be easily 
proved by mathematical induction; in fact, it may be looked 
upon as mathematical Induction in reverse for, clearly, if 
any finite number can be reached from 1 then, reversing the 
process, from any finite number 1 can be reached.
It has been noticed, perhaps, that the infinite, as such, 
has not appeared once as an object of study among the 
Pythagoreans; instances of the concept have arisen many times 
in the mathematical processes and principles used by them, 
but they were only incidental. However, there is one
32exception to this remark; we have a comment, by Philoponous , 
according to which *In dealing with the infinite, to the 
Pythagoreans and Plato the relation of whole to part is that 
of infinite to infinite*. The meaning of this is obscure, 
but it may well be a reference to the property of the infinite 
which was to cause its rejection by so many thinkers in the 
past and which was to become its defining property to Dedekind 
in more recent times. We do seem to have, however, in this 
statement of Philoponous9, at least a recognition of the 
property of the infinite of having parts which are themselves 
Infinite. But did the Pythagoreans, and Plato, go so far as 
to think of the infinite as having parts equal to itself?
32 Philoponous, Cammentaria in Aristotelem. Graeca, 
Yol. 16, Berlin.
23
Did they see in this property a denial of the axiom "The 
whole is greater than its parts*? It is unfortunate that the 




We have seen that Pythagoras had identified the geometric 
point {a nnit having position or, as Tannery put it, "the 
number one in space*) and the unit of number (the point with­
out position)# It is necessary now, in order to provide the 
background requisite to an understanding of post-Pythagorean 
developments in infinite processes, to review briefly some of
the other tenets of the Pythagorean doctrine# We are told by
33Diogenes Laertius that
Pythagoras taught that the principle of all things is the monad, or unit; arising from this monad is the infinite dyad.### from the monad and the infinite dyad arise numbers; from numbers points; from points lines, from lines planes, from these solid figures and from these sensible bodies#•••
34and, by Aristotle , that
The Pythagoreans seem to have looked upon number as the principle and# so to speak, the matter of which beings consist
and
They supposed the elements of number to be the elements of being, and pronounced the whole 
heaven to be harmony and number
35while from Philolaus of Thebes (c#430 B#C#), the Pythagorean 
who gave the first written exposition of the doctrine, we 
have the statement
33 Laertius, op#cit♦, chapter on "Pythagoras*
34 A. Seth, Enc. Brit., Werner ed., N.Y., 1900, 22:138
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Number is great and perfect and omnipotent, and the principle and guide of divine and human 
life.
It seems fairly certain then that the Pythagoreans had 
not only identified the unit of number with the geometric 
point, but that they had, further, identified, or father 
confused, the geometric point with the physical point, or 
particle. From this it followed that not only were geometric 
loci pluralities of units (numbers) in position but that 
physical bodies also could be regarded as such. Hence the 
Pythagorean formula: Being is Number e r r *  eo-zrc) •
hence also much of what Is otherwise oeeult or mystical in 
their doctrine (the belief, for instance, that physical 
bodies possess properties that are governed and revealed by 
number) 4 We shall also see, in a subsequent chapter, that 
this doctrine had much to do with the paradoxes that Zeno 
propounded*
It has been shown above that the identification of the 
unit and the geometric point had led the Pythagoreans to 
represent certain classes of numbers by geometric figures 
which were made up of discrete points; but there is reason 
to believe that in their School the identification of 
arithmetic and geometry had gone much further. It is known 
that Thales introduced the notions of the "equation* and the 
"proportion" into Greek mathematics; for among the theorems 
whose discovery is attributed to him are:
56 Allman, op.cit*. p* 10
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a) The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,
b) The sides of equiangular triangles are 
proportional,
which, it is seen, explicitly introduce these concepts* From
this modest beginning Pythagoras and his successors (notably
Arehytas37 of Tarentum) created the elaborate Theory of 
38Proportions , substantially as given in Euclid, Bk. VII*
In this theory we find the first clear-cut instance of an
attempt deliberately made to bring together two hitherto
distinct branches of mathematics* Commenting on this theory 
39Allman says:
Pythagoras elaborated the notion of proportion into a theory whieh reached the rank of a mathe­
matical method, applicable to both arithmetic andgeometry and in this respect he is comparable to escartes, to whom is due the combination of Algebra and Geometry*
It is necessary now to search out the fundamental axiom 
by which the junction of arithmetic and geometry was effected 
in this theory* We have seen that the Pythagorean conception 
of the straight line was that of a sequence of juxtaposed 
points; this led, naturally, to their well-known assumption 
that any two line segments are commensurable* Now, from this 
It follows that, in this theory, to any line-segment, jO , 
there corresponded a rational number, m/n, as its length*
37 Cajori, on*cit»« p* 20
38 Heath, History of Greek Mathematics, 1:294
39 Allman, loc*cit*
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For, let the line-segment, £ , be 
taken as the unit of length, and lay out 
p  and e  at any angle, & , as shown in 
the figure* Join C and B and extend AC
to any point D. Draw DB parallel to CB
*
and cutting AB, extended, at E. L e t e 
denote the segment AD and *  the segment 
AB; then
/ * /#  =. m/n, since any two segments are commensurable.
But P /$ since the triangles AGB, ABB are equiangular.
Hence, if r denote the length of (o ,
r/l = m/n, that is, r s m/n, as was to be shown.
Again, we have seen (page /3 above) that it is assumed 
in this theory that tb any two numbers, m, n, there correspond 
two line-segments , 2/, whose ratio is m/n. It follows from 
this (by a proof similar to the one given above) that to any 
rational number, m/n, there corresponded a line-segment of 
length m/n. Putting these two results together we obtain 
the following fundamental axiom:
To every point on the line corresponds a rational number and, conversely, to every rational number corresponds a point on the line.
This may be looked upon as the Pythagorean analogue of 
the Cantor-Dedekind axiom.
It is well-known that the discovery of the existence 
of incommensurable lines was long kept a secret within the inner school; the final divulgence of this secret contributed 
of course, to the collapse of this theory and the entire 
Pythagorean doctrine.
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If we state this axiom in the equivalent foxm
a ___ mT) n
where a and b are line-segments and m, n are whole numbers,
then the seemingly extreme views expressed by some later
Pythagoreans acquire meaning and credibility. For we are
41told by Proclus that "Eratosthenes looked on proportion as 
the bond { d e r /* - ) of mathematics", and by Theon 
that "Eratosthenes showed that all figures also result from 
the proportion", while, expressing his own views now, he 
adds: "Everything In mathematics is composed of proportions 
of some quantities, and the principle and (constituent) 
element of mathematics is the nature of the proportion".
That these views are not as extreme as they sound 
becomes clear if it is observed that much of the mathematics 
of that period can be —  and was then —  reduced to the 
simple notions of ratio and equality, that is, the notion 
of the proportion. Indeed, one of the most striking 
characteristics of the mathematics of that period is the 
omnipresence of the proportion.
Proclus, op.cit.« p. 43




Perhaps the earliest and best known example of successive
45rational approximations to irrational numbers is that of Theonfs 
"side and diagonal” numbers. Theon stated his algorithm 
thus:
Let two units be laid out, of which we take 
one as the side and the other as the diameter... add to the side the diameter and to the diameter two sides .... the diameter is now 3 and the side 2#Again to the side add the diameter and to the 
diameter twice the side#.# the diameter is now 7 and the side 5... and the addition being thus continuously made the ratio alternates, the square on the diameter being now one more now one less 
than twice the square on the side... therefore the 
squares of all the diameters are the double of the squares of all the sides, alternately exceeding or falling short by one...
Symbolically, if s„, d,? denote the "side and diagonal”
r A *numbers obtained at the n step then Theon* s rule gives 
the formulas
Sn+1 — S/7 -*• d/7d„^ = 2s* + d*
d nwhich yield the sequence of ratios —
1 , 3 , 7 , 17 , 41 , 99 , 239 , 577 ,I I 5 12 75 B5 135
beginning with d, r 1, s, = 1# In this sequence, Theon seems
cL 3 2to say, the ratio —  alternates so that d<7 is now 2sn ■+• 1
now 2s^ - 1#
43 See p. above
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aaJ. Dupuis sees in this the solution, in integers, of 
the indeterminate equation y5* - 2x* ̂  1; for, suppose y - a, 
x = b is such a solution* Then a 2 b 2, = ̂ l. Form, hy Theon* s 
rule, the values a* r a /- 2b, b* ^ a f  b. We haves 
a1* - 2b*̂  = (a -f 2b)* — 2(a + b)Z= - a* 2b* = ± 1, that is, 
a*, b* are a solution also* How, a - 1, b - 1 is a solution; 
hence Theon*s rule gives an infinity of solutions*
However, Theon* s construction has also been looked upon,
45notably by Heath , as an algorithm for successive approximations 
to the square root of 2* For, from
y - 2x = *1
we get
? -  J z * l .  l |  = \Izx V X* x
which show that the term ̂  of the above sequence converges
S /f  v*-'to f z  , being alternately less and greater.
Theon gave neither a proof nor a derivation of his
46algorithm. But Proclus asserts that the Pythagoreans 
discovered the **side and gtiagonal** numbers, and that a proof 
of their characteristic property was given by*fciirf*in the 
second book of the Elements* The "him** in question is, 
undoubtedly, Euclid; for, in Book II, prop* 10, we find the 
theorem:
44 Dupuis, op.cit* p. 72
45 Heath, History of Greek Mathematics, Vol. 1; also Allman op.cit*
46 Procli Diadoehf in Platonis rempublicam eommentarii, ed. Kroll, Vol. II, Teubner, 1901.
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"If a straight line be bisected, and a 
straight line be added to it in a straight line, the square on the whole with the added straight 
line and the square on the added straight line both together are double of the square on the 
half and of the square described on the straight 
line made up of the half and the added straight line as on one straight line",
which means that if AB is bisected, at C, and the whole line
is extended to D
*____________f__________ ± ________*
then IdV  Id2 = 2(Ac’+- CD?) 
or, in modern notation
(Ex -+- f t  ■+■ y^ & 2^ + (x t y)2̂  , whence
(Ex f  f t  — 2(x f t  —  2 x x -  y %  an identity*
From this it is clear, says Heath, that if x, , y, satisfy
either of
_ z. a. , 2 -Ex ~ y = 1, Ex - y ̂  -1
then (x, + y/), (Ex, + f , ) satisfy the other*
However, neither of these two views of the meaning of 
Theon#s algorithm is satisfactory* There is no convincing 
evidence either that his purpose was to solve the indeterminate 
equations y 2-~ Ex^ ~ ±-1 or that he wanted to find rational 
approximations to the square root of E. On the other hand, 
his opening statement, "As unity is the principle of all 
figures, according to the highest and generating ratio, so 
also is the ratio of the diagonal to the side found in the 
unit", and Proclus* definite assignment of the "side and 
diagonal" numbers to the Pythagoreans, strongly suggest that
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Theon*s purpose was to defend the Master*s doctrine that the 
unit is the constituent element of all numbers and the point 
that of all figures.
And it must be observed, in the proof given by Euclid, 
that any whole number K may be substituted for the unit, that 
is, if x, , y, , satisfy either of
2xz — y 2 — k, 2x z- y z- -k 
then (x, ■+ 7 ,), (Ex, -t- 7 ,) satisfy the other. Thus, to r  K -  2 
say, and for x, - 1, y, = 2 we easily get the sequence
2 , 4 , 10 , 24 ,T *  T  17
of successive rational approximations to the square root of 2,
But such a ehoiee of K would not do for the purpose of the
dalgorithm; for now the ratio —  alternates so that the squareS<7
on the diameter is now 2 more now 2 less than twice the square
on the side. The unit does not play the all-important role of
"generating principle" though the square root of 2 is 
approximated just as effectively as before,
A curious derivation of Theon*s formulas, due to P, Bergh,
47is given by M, Cantor ,
"If we start with an isosceles right triangle,ABC, of side s*? and diagonal d« , and extend each of the legs a distance d* , to the points E and D, and complete the triangle EBB, then the newdiagonal will be 2s„ ■+• dn , and the new side -h d*i.If the perpendiculars AF, CO are drawn the proof is obvious",
47 Verlesungen uber Geshichte der Mathematik, I, p. 437; 





It is elearly implied in this construction that the sides 
and diagonals obtained in the way described are Theon* s **side 
and diagonal*1 numbers* That they cannot be, however, becomes 
immediately evident when it is noticed that a pair of numbers, 
d*7 , s n y obtained by Bergh1 s method are never commensurable, 
whereas Theon*s numbers always are* Again for any two pairs, 
dr? , sr? , and dw , s*? , of Bergh9s numbers, we always have
d^ d-vn
S V) S 'VV\
an equality which is never true of Theon*s numbers* If, how­
ever, Bergh did not offer them as Theon*s numbers (and it is 
hard to see what else he may have meant by them), then no 
derivation of Theon* s numbers has been given.
But a satisfactory derivation of Theon* s algorithm, 
based on the interpretation of its character advanced here 
(a defense of the Pythagorean doctrine) and proceeding 
entirely by Pythagorean considerations is easy to give.
The discovery of incommensurables was a serious blow to 
this doctrine; hence, that efforts were made to circumvent 
the difficulty may be safely assumed. Again, that the
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diagonal of the unit square is incommensurable with 
the side was known* It was natural then, and quite 
likely, that attention was given to the more
general case I
idlere one side is still preserved as a "unit**, the important 
constituent element of the doctrine* From this, by the 
Pythagorean theorem
(1) y,* ^ 2x,2 - 1
Similarly, for the case
(z x
y£ = 2x* + 1*
which leads to
(2)
From (1) and (2) it follows that
(3) - y* ~ r l  - = i
Hence, by use of the Euclidean theorem given above,
(4) (2x 1- y )z -  2(x -h y f  = 2x2-  y 2- 
Theon*s formulas
x L « xj -h yj ;
yi  =  - 7j
r lor 2
follow from (4) ♦
i
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In the derivation of the sequence
1 , 3 ,  ? ,1 2 ,  1 I 3 12
it is of interest to note that the principle of mathematical 
induction has been tacitly invoked. For, from the fact that 
x, - 1, yY = 1 satisfy the conditions y l- 2x*~ ±1, and the 
fact that if x, , y, satisfy it so do x z = x, + y, , y^ = 2x,^-y, 
the infinite sequence follows.
Another interesting matter that may be pointed out in the 
derivation of this sequence is the example it affords of the 
failure of the ancients to make (at times obvious) general­
isations. That any Tufoole number, k, could be substituted for 
1, in the equations y 2 — 2x z = ̂ l, has been pointed out above, 
when 2 was used to find another sequence of approximations to 
the square root of the same number, 2. But still another 
generalization, in another direction, is quite easy to make.
K may be substituted for the number 2 of the given equations, 
to derive a sequence of approximations to the square root of 
k. Thus, taking k - 3 that is, starting with the equation 
(1) y z - 3x3 = 1,
we note that x = 1, y = 2 is a solution. Assuming that x t , 
y, is a solution of (1) we seek numbers
4 n\ X* - +  OF'y*. « mx/ ny, 
which are also a solution of (1), that is, such that
 ̂ rr Z- iy2 - 3xz = 1 , or 
^  (mx, -f" ny, )2- 3(px, qy, )*= 1.
Rewriting (3) in the form
(4) (n 2' -  3q2)y,z+- 2(mn - 3pq)x,y, + (m*- 3p*)x2 =.1
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we see that if
(5)
this equation becomes
n - Sq* = 1 mn - 3pq = 0
m 2-- 3p* - -3
y,* - 3X/Z = 1
true by assumption. Hence, if numbers p, q, m, n can be found 
to satisfy (5) the numbers x?. , y* of (2) are a solution of (1)* 
Ifrow such numbers are: m = 3, n = 2, p = 2, q = 1. Ife have then 
the formulas:
Xz = 2x, -h y, y^ = 3x, 2y,
which yield, beginning with x, = 1, y, = 2, the sequence
2 , 7 , 26, 97 , ........T 1 JS
of rational approximations to the square root of 3*
The terms of the sequence thus found approach f 3 from
above. If approximations from below are desired use should be
made of the equation y 2 - 5xa= -k, where k is any suitable
constant. If, as in Theon* s sequence, a sequence approaching
fT alternately from above and from below is desired, then
constants c, k must be found such that if X/ , y f is a solution
of either of y 3x^ = c, y z -  3x*= - k, then
x*. — px, -+- qy, ya - mx, + ny,
is a solution of the other.
The next example of successive rational approximations to 
irrational numbers is furnished by the Alexandrian School.
In the "Prolegomena to the Syntaxis of Ptolemy" —  an 
anonymous manuscript, variously attributed to Diophantus,
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Pappus, or some later writer, living in Alexandria —  is
found the following passage.
We shall show then how the square roots of 
given numbers are found. •• In finding the area 
of a triangle, by the general formula, Heron is led to the number 720, whose root he is to find.This is what he says .... w
This is followed by a set of instructions on how to
proceed in order to find the desired root. As if written by
Heron himself (who is noted for this fault) there is no hint o f
p 'roof
or derivation of the method used.
Reduced to modem symbolism the method may be presented 
thus. If A is a number, not a perfeet square, and if a© is 
the nearest integral square root, then a closer approximation 
is given by
a, = 1/2 (a. + 4 )
0.o
and closer ones, in succession, according to the law
a*+l = 1/2 (a„ ̂  4 )a'vj
48Paul Tannery suggests the following derivation of this 
formula. If A is the number whose root is to be found, and 
if a* is the nearest rational sqpare contained in A . we may 
set
▲ = (a + b)* = a* -+■ 2ab -+ b* = a V  r 
and seek to find b. It is clear that
r _ 2ab ■+■ b^ b*—   ------  ^ b -t- — > b. Hence,2a 2a 2a
a /= a ^ ^ = a + 4^_aa = l/2(a+ 4)
48 1P. Tannery, Memoires Scientifiques, tome 1, No.53
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(which is Heron1 s formula) is an approximate value, from 
above, of f k .
set
2Again, if a is the smallest square containing A we may
A - (a - b)* = a*1 — (Sab — b*) = a^- r.
It is clear that
I _ Sab — b _ y. b -u Hence 2a Sa ~ D Sa D# 1163100
a, - a - s| = a- = l/2 (a^ J)
is an approximate value, again from above, of /a  •
This method is described again by Theon of Alexandria and 
reappears, much later, in the Byzantine School, in the writings 
of Maximus Planudes (15th cent.) and Nicholas Bhabdas (14th 
cent•)• ___________
The Delian problem had been shown by Hippocrates of Chios
to be reducible to the discovery of two geometric means
between a and 2a; for from
a x yx y 2a
it follows that x — 2a • Of the many ways* invented by the 
mathematicians of this period for the solution of this problem 
one led to a geometric algorithm for the construction of 
successive approximations to the cube root of a number*
49At the beginning of his third book Pappus discusses
j|c See Appendix I for a "mechanical* solution.
49 Collection Mathematique* tr. Paul Ver lecke, Paris, 
1955, 2 vols.
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at great length the problem of duplicating the cube and 
criticizes severely a solution submitted to him by a contemporary 
mathematician (whom he does not name) on the ground that it 
attempts to solve, by ruler and compass, a problem which is 






Let AB, A/“ be two straights at right angles; draw through 
B the straight BA equal to AB; draw the joiner meeting BA at 
E; through E draw the straight E© parallel to AT ; extend BA ; 
draw through A the straight A H  parallel to BE ahd put the 
straights 4 H, H A equal to BA*
Draw through the points N, A , HT , X, the straights HO,
A M, Z  77 , K9 parallel to BE; put KP equal to BA and cut KP into 
two equal parts at the point Z . Let Z Q be to a straight ©T 
as the straight K© is to the straight ©Zand let ©T be to a 
straight ©^ as the straight Z 0 is to the straight ©T* On 
E  Jl cut off XH: equal to AB and draw the join JK and the 
join X4> •
Draw through Z  the straight Z  ̂  parallel to the 
straight X<p and, from ^ , the straight parallel to the
straight K E  • LetA2 M be to a straight MA1 as the straight
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A M is to the straight M Q , and the straight A*M be to a
straight MB* as the straight O  M is to the straight MA* • Cut
off on the straight OK the straight M r *  equal to the straight 
Ab and draw the join rVJ and the join r % B 9 •
Through O  draw the straight C2 A * parallel to the 
straight r~* 3 9 9 and through ^* the straight ZS9B9 parallel 
to A N. Let the straight HE* be to a straight B2* as the 
straight A H is to the straight HE* and let Z*H be to a
straight HQ* as the straight E*H is to the straight HZ**
Draw the join ©*/“ , the straights Z#K*, E*/I *, parallel
to the straight 0* r and, through K*, A *, the straights K*M*, 
A 9N* parallel to the straights AT , BA ♦ It is to be shown 
that the straights M*K*, M*/\ * are the mean proportionals bt 
the straights AT, BA •
Pappus criticized the exactness of this solution but it 
appears, as Tannery has pointed out, that the criticism is 
wholly unmerited, for the inventor of this construction could 
not have meant it for anything but a means of indefinite 
approximation to the two means sought*
?I*et it be required to calculate x — “V a2b, y=^fabzw, says Tannery*, wand, to fix the ideas, let b < a*. Let x„ be an approximate value of x; the indicated construction amounts to taking for a closer approximation,
x, % a/ 1 a (a — b) a *• -f- ax o -f- x?a* -h axTTxf
50 /P* Tannery, Memoires Scientifiques, tome 1, Mo* 8
41
If one puts lo r  x-*-̂ * , x, ~ x+<^<
one obtains easily
_ .  1 ________
ck ~ ' Sx 2 -h 3<£> -*-'<=£ *
1 + (a - x) (a 2x v-<A )
One concludes from this that <C is of the same sign as Ji and smaller in absolute value, 
and that <£/<?• decreases as */<a increases....
Let it be required, for example, to find Jf z 9 whose value is 1*2539 ... Make a = 1, b ~ 1/2; 
then l/x0 =*fz% one has, in succession
1/xo = 4/3 = 1*5355 ...l/x, - 37/29 t= 1.2758
l/x* - 6566/5197 - 1.2635 ...l/x3 = 104244667/82688489 =■ 1.2607 ...
Or, by the second formula, giving the approximate values of y, making b 1, a — 2, 
whence x * = 3/2,
y o rr 9/8 =: 1.1250 ...y, = 46/37 = 1.2432 ...
By taking the arithmetic means of the preceding values a much more rapid approximation is obtained
1/2 [ 4/3 + 9/87 = 59/48 = 1.2290 ...
1/2 [ 37/29 + 46/37] =  2703/2146 = 1.2595 ...
It is doubtful if the ancients ever made use of this method; at any rate no known record 
of its use exists*.
Thus ends Tannery*s discussion of this method. But 
though Tannery has preferred to give an arithmetic explanation, 
the process, as given in Pappus, is geometric; that is, it 
does not give numerical values of the geometric means found.
Of course, these values are rational if a and be are rational.
But it is of interest to explain the geometric construction 
itself, especially since Pappus has omitted the proof.
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It is required to find successive approximations, x i , 
y i , to the two geometric means, x,y, between two given lines, 
a,b, where a ? h*
1 i * /Co Ci Ci Cx Cz C3 c c
L M  b
T  / / ̂
JS / ! x/ /  <2.
Draw AB* > B„D, each equal to a, at right angles; draw BE, 
equal to b, at right angles to BoD and complete the triangle 
A B « E x t e n d  AB® to the right and draw through Co a parallel 
to it* Draw the equal rectangles BoCoBlCt, B*C£B,C, , B,C, B̂  C*, 
and so on* Let So be the mid-point of BeD*
B Co S COn B.Co find point T0 such that = -— f- and point L-*>ScaCc? T0C0q n pn nsuch that = -JL-1 • Draw S^s*, T * t 0 parallel to ABo ;To Co L* Go
these lines, x 0 , ya , are first approximations to the means 
sought*
Lay off B*M„ equal to a and join L«M0| B^Mo. Draw T.z-o, 
parallel to L*M0 and <^S, parallel to AB, ; draw
B»C, cutting off x, , y, on S, , r*z7 respectively; x,, y, 
are the next approximations to x, y*
On B(C,find points T, , L,making 
B,C , S,Cf T, C(
S7cT ^ tTcT “ i^cT
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On b;cj lay off B*M, equal to a; join L,M, , B, M, and draw 
T,-zr, , &<67 parallel to I*,M, • Draw r> rj, parallel to B,Bz,
and BfOz cutting off y* on c? Sz, ^  respectively; 
y^are the next approximations to x , y.
On BtC*find points T*, L* mating
Ba.Cz Sj.Ci Tj Cj,
SzCz TzCz 1*2 0 z
On B*C^ lay off B]M2 equal to a; join LZM*, BxM,and draw
Sz^L parallel to t»*M3 • Draw zr̂  parallel to BzB̂  , and
B|Cj cutting x 3 , y3 on ̂  S3 , respectively; x 39 are
the next approximations to x, y*
Continue this process indefinitely; notice that the 
triangle B„LnM„ approaches the limiting form BIM, the 
proportion
BC = SG _ TC SC ~ LC
always holding* From this we have
B’G* SfCf T’C1
from which a/x — x/y =r y/b, a result which shows that the 




THE PARADOXES OF ZENO
Zeno of Elea (b. 500 B.C.), a pupil and friend of
51Parmenides, is said, by Plato , to have written certain 
"discourses" in whieh he defended the views of his teacher. 
In answer to a question put to him by Socrates, Zeno says:
"You do not quite apprehend the true motive of this performance (the writing of the "discourses"), which is not really such an artificial piece of work as you imagine.•• For the truth is that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who ridicule him, and urge the many ridiculous and contradictory results which were supposed to follow from the assertion of the One. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the Many, and intended to show that greater and more ridiculous consequences follow from their hypothesis of the existence of 
the Many, if carried out, than from the hypothesis of the existence of the One. A love of controversy led me to write the book in the days of my youth, and someone stole the writings, and I had there­fore no choice about the publication of them ..."
Zenofs discourses unfortunately have not come down to
our times and the only knowledge we have of his arguments
against "the partisans of the Many" are —  excluding the
views expressed in the Parmenides as irrelevant here —  the
52paradoxes discussed by Aristotle in his Physics and
attributed by him to Zeno, and repeated later, with some
53additional ones, in the Commentaries of Simplicius • These
51 The Works of Plato. "The Parmenides", tr. B.Jowett, N.Y.
52 Aristotle, op.cit. Physics VI52 Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor 
priores oommentaria. ed. H. Diels, Berlin, 1882.
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paradoxes hare, from the earliest times, been treated, by 
philosophers and commentators alike, as mere sophistic 
fallacies and due to the ignorance of one uninstructed in the 
subleties of the infinite. Much time and effort was expended, 
but with little success, to the detection and exposure of the 
errors involved in them* The failures of these attempts were 
due, in part, to the faulty theories of the infinite and 
continuity that were brought to bear on them, but to a larger 
extent to the fact that in none of these attempts had the true 
character of these paradoxes, as arguments directed to some 
specific purpose, the disproof of some tenet of ancient philo­
sophy, been recognized*
Many, however, have accepted Zeno's paradoxes as "not 
really such an artificial piece of work* as could be expected 
from a young, pugnacious sophist defending the views of his 
master* Thus, Grote54 sees in them an instance of the 
negative side of Grecian speculation, the probing, testing and 
scrutinizing, beginning then to come out more and more in 
philosophical inquiries and occupying as large a measure of 
the intellectual in philosophy as the positive side. "We 
shall find the two going hand in hand, and the negative vein 
the more impressive and characteristic of the two from Zeno 
downward in our history" ♦
55It was left for Paul Tannery however to detect the 
specific aim of Zeno's paradoxes, rescue them from the scanty
54 History of Greece, Vis48Kg ■Pour I'histoire de la science hellene, Zenon d'Elee, 
Paris, 1930* r
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esteem in which they were held, and re-present them to the 
world as a single, unanswerable polemie against the 
Pythagorean Doctrine.
"Such a proposition is absolutely false", says Tannery; "a body, a surface, or a line is not a totality.of juxtaposed points. The mathe­
matical point is not a unit; it is a pure zero, a nothing of quantity".
Drawing first on Simplicius, whom he quotes as saying:
"After having shown that if being has no magnitude it does not exist Zeno adds: *If it exists it is necessary that every being, have some magnitude, a certain thickness, and that 
there be intervals between its parts. And the same may be said of smaller parts; they too must have magnitudes and intervals between them. And what has been said once can always be repeated; 
there will thus be no last term where there are no parts different from one another! Thus, if there is a plurality then things must be at once large and small; so small that they have no magnitude, and so large that they are infinite* "
Tannery interprets as follows:
If it be claimed that a body is made up of points then the principle of infinite divisi­bility leads to parts so small that they have no magnitude, which would also make their total, the body, of zero magnitude. But if it is assumed that these ultimate parts do have magnitude (the other horn of the dilemma), since there is an infinity of them the body must be infinitely large"
This argument, Tannery thinks, amounts to a rigorous 
proof that the infinitely divisible cannot be conceived of as 
a sum of indivisibles. He also points out that Simplicius 
errs in asserting that Zeno*s paradox leads tp the result 
that things are at once large and small, a result unacceptable 
because of the contradiction. It is rather a dilemma, each 
horn of which is individually unacceptable.
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The next paradox examined by Tannery is the one in 
which, according to Simplicius, Zeno argues thus: "If there 
is a plurality, it is necessary that they be as many as they 
are, neither more nor fewer* Being as many as they are they 
are limited* But if there is a plurality, they are unlimited, 
for there are always others between units, and still others 
among these, and thus things would be unlimited"* This he 
interprets as follows: to say that bodies are a sum of points 
is to say, implicitly, that the number of points is unlimited* 
On the other hand, the principle of divisibility requires 
that we admit the existence of points between any two distinct 
points; hence there must be an unlimited number of points* 
Zeno, by this argument, forces the adversary into a contra­
diction*
The other paradoxes examined by Tannery are the so-called
f arguments against motion1 preserved, in very compressed foxm
by Aristotle and variously presented in expanded form by
56later writers. As presented by Burnet they are:
1:- You cannot traverse an infinite number of points in finite time. You must traverse the half of any given distance before you traverse the whole, and the half of that again before you traverse the whole, and the half of that again before you can traverse it* This goes on ad infinitum so that there are an infinite number in any given space, and thus it cannot be traversed 
in finite time.
2:- The second argument is the famous puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise* Achilles must first reach the place from which the tortoise started. By that time the tortoise will have 
got on a little way. Achilles must then traverse that, and still the tortoise will be ahead* He 
is always nearer, but he never makes up to it.
'55 Early Greek Philosophy, p. 322
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5:- The third argument against the possi­bility of motion through space made up of points is that, on this hypothesis, an arrow in any moEmemt of its flight must be at rest in some 
particular point, and thus at rest all the time.
4:- Suppose three rows of points in juxta­position, as shown in fig. 1
A * ♦ • • • ♦  ♦ A « . . .  * »fig.l B . . . . . . fig.2 B . • • « .C « « . . .  . C . . . .One of these, B, is immovable, while A and C 
move in opposite directions with equal velocities so as to come into the positions shown in fig.2. The movement of 0 relatively to A will be doubleits movement relatively to B or, in other words,any given point in C has passed twice as many points of A as it has of B. It cannot, therefore, be the case that an instant of time corresponds to the passage from one point to another.
Tannery thinks that these arguments were given in geno's 
♦discourses1 in the form of a dialogue. A Pythagorean 
adversary is to be convinced that space is not a sum of 
indivisible parts. The first argument shows that if space 
were really so constituted then It could not be traversed 
in finite time.
Against this the adversary objects (as Aristotle does) 
and says that the dichotomy of the space is not an actual one 
but only potential and thus it can still be traversed in 
finite time.
Zieno answers by the second argument in which this 
objection cannot be made.
The Pythagorean now pleads that he has conceded too 
iauch. Finite time itself, he argues, may be capable of 
infinite dichotomy, for isn't it also a sum of instants? And 
what prevents our making the successive positions assumed
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correspond to the successive instants of time?
Zeno now counters by his third argument. To every 
instant of time corresponds a definite position of the arrow. 
But to occupy a definite position is to be at rest. Hence 
the arrow is at rest every instant, and therefore the entire 
finite time.
The adversary now says that this is not the only corre­
spondence that can be conceived. May not every instant of 
time correspond, not to a position, but to a change of 
position, a passage from point to point?
Zeno answers this with his fourth argument. If such a 
correspondence were possible then, since a point of C passes 
through two points of A whenever it passes through one point 
of B we have the absurd result that two Instants are equal to 
one instant.
Tannery points out that Zeno is not (as is often over­
looked) at all arguing against the possibility of motion. 
Indeed it is quite clear, after this re-constitution of 
Tannery*s, that Zeno has only sought to show that, as he 
himself said, "greater and more ridiculous consequences (the 
impossibility of motion) follow from their hypothesis of the 
existence of the Many”.
There seems to be no way open to doubt the correctness of 
Tannery's interpretation of the meaning and real aim of Zeno's 
paradoxes. The error they attacked was present in the
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Pythagorean doctrine, they did reveal, successfully and
devastatingly, this error and, as reconstituted by Tannery,
they fit together too well and too logically for just this
purpose, to have been meant for any other. Further, this
interpretation of Tannery1 s has raised Zeno from a rather
dubious foimer position to that of a "logician of the first 
57rank". We shall see that his influence on the trend 
mathematics was to take was great.
57 Cajori, American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 22
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CHAPTER VIII
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OP THE INFINITE 
58Aristotle (b.584 B.C.) gave the best discussion in 
antiquity of the concepts of infinity and continuity. In 
various parts of his Physics. De Caelo. and Metaphysics we 
find various aspects of these concepts dealt with, in an 
apparently disconnected manner; yet careful study and piecing 
together reveal a sound and consistent investigation and 
analysis of these concepts.
Inquiring into the causes that give rise to the notion
59of the infinite Aristotle finds that they are:
1: The nature of time —  it has neither beginning 
nor end.2: The division of magnitude —  it is, potentially, an endless process.3: The 11 corning to be11 and the "passing away" —  
for that from which things continually come to be, and pass away, must be infinite.4: The concept of "limitation" —  This concept leads inevitably to the notion of the infinite.
For, a thing is either limited or unlimited; if it is unlimited it is infinite. If it is limited, it has its limit in something which is either limited or unlimited. If this some­thing is unlimited then it is infinite; if it is limited then it has its limit in something else which is either limited or unlimited, and so on. Thus, an infinity is arrived at 
again.5: Magnitudes and things outside the heaven never give out in our thought —  for if we thirds: of anything outside the heaven we can­not refrain of thinfcing of something beyond 
that, and of something else beyond that, and so on.
«)8 The Works of Aristotle, tr. and ed. I .A. Smith and W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1908-1930 53 IMa, Physics, VI
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Examining next the various senses in which the word
"infinite** isused he finds that these differ according as
the word is used of s
1: That which is incapable of being gone through, or traversed,2: That which admits of being traversed the process, however, having no end,
3i That which with difficulty admits of being traversed,
4: That which naturally admits of being traversed but which is not actually traversed, or does not actually come to an end*
The first use of the word given above is the trivial one 
in which the word is applied to things which, by nature, are 
neither finite nor infinite; it is the way in which the voice 
might be said to be "invisible"* The second is the strict 
use, the one to be examined. The third is the approximate, 
exaggerated use of the word, as in "the boundless, infinite 
sea"# The fourth is that in which one speaks of "the endless­
ness of a ring or circle; there is no definite end*
Examining next the views that had been held by previous 
thinkers about the infinite he finds that it had been held 
to be:
1: An attribute of the elements (earth, water, air, fire) 
as subjects,2: A subject itself (as by the cosmogonists)5: An attribute of an abstract subject.
Finally, as to the processes that lead to the infinite 
he finds that they reduce to two* "What is infinite is so 
in respect of addition, or division, or both".
He finds that the first two of the views listed above
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involve an aetual infinite; the last a potential one* He 
rejects the former as impossible, whether as a subject or as 
an attribute, and accepts the latter as possible under 
certain restricted conditions*
It is neither possible nor desirable to give all of
Aristotle*s arguments and proofs against the actual infinite
in this survey* Some however will be given for the sake of
the historic interest attached to them. It must first be
explained that by an ’•actual* infinite Aristotle means, in
some cases, a ••physical" infinite, whether of one, two or
three dimensions and that, apparently, to him the acceptance
of such an infinite requires the acceptance of an infinite
universe to contain it* "Not every definite magnitude can
be exceeded for there would be something, in that case, bigger
60than the heaven"* But, an infinite heaven is impossible,
he says. For, "if it is infinite then any two radii are
infinite; hence the space between them is infinite. But an
infinite space eannot be traversed. And yet, we see the
61heayen, in its dally revolution* traversing all space*.
Hence, the heaven is not infinite and thus actual physical 
infinities do not exist*
Again, arguing now against the possibility of infinite 
bodies, he starts with the assumption that the velocities of 
falling bodies are proportional to their weights, an assumption
60 Physics. Ill, 207 b, 19-21
61 De Oaelo
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which makes their times of motion, for a fixed distance, 
inversely proportional to their weights* "Hence*1, he continues, 
"for an infinite body the time of motion is infinitely small, 
no matter what the distance traversed, which is absurd* If 
you say it (the time of motion) is zero, then the infinite 
body does not move (contrary to the hypothesis); if you say 
it is a finite time, then a finite body can be found to 
perform this motion in this finite time and (thus) the finite 
and the infinite (bodies) have equal motions, which is absurd 
(since, in view of the assumption, they would then have equal 
weights)•
Noticeable in these arguments of Aristotle9s are the errors
in his physical assumptions* Many centuries later, Galileo
62challenged them both, and of one of them he said: "It is
clear that Aristotle could not have made the experiment"*
But equally noticeable are some true notions Aristotle had 
concerning the finite and the infinite* for it is clearly 
implied, in his last argument, that a finite quantity, no 
matter how small, can, by multiplication, be made to exceed 
any other finite quantity, no matter how great, and that a 
finite quantity, no matter how great, cannot be made infinite 
by multiplication.
To explain now what Aristotle means by the "potential 
infinite" it is best to proceed by way of the few examples 
that he has himself used. We have his statement that "What 
is infinite is so in respect of addition, or division, or
62 Two New Sciences, tr. H'*Crew and A.DeSalvio, New 
York, 1955, p. 65
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both". Here, of course, infinite is not to be understood, 
naively, as meaning **of infinite magnitude** for, clearly, 
magnitudes do not become great as a result of division* The 
meaning of the statement then must be, simply, that the 
infinite arises, somehow, as a result of either of these 
operations, or both. Again, he says: **The infinite is so in 
virtue of its endlessly changing into something else ....** in 
which the underscored word is significant; and again, **The 
infinite must not be regarded as a particular thing ... but... 
though finite at any moment, always different from moment to 
moment*1, where again the underscored word is significant.
Consider now the operation of division as applied to an 
initial finite magnitude, a straight line say. The principle 
of **infinite divisibility”, which Aristotle accepts, ensures 
an endless repetition of the process; the result is an endless 
sequence of terms. This is the "potential infinite** whose 
existence he asserts. **But**, he explains ,^not in the sense 
that it might ever be placed before you tpiite complete; 
rather you have to gain a knowledge of its existence. And you 
will have to understand that the fact that the division does 
not give out ensures a continued potentiality for the actu­
ality, but not a completed existence**. It is to be noticed 
that, with the "potential infinite” thus understood (to wit, 
as an infinite sequence, in modern terminology), all the 
passages quoted make good sense. But more evidence in 
support of this interpretation is available.
63 Metaphysics. Q - 6, 1048 b, 13-18
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Consider now the operation of addition and the following 
example of a potential infinite given hy Aristotle. ”In the 
case of a finite magnitude”, he says, ” you may take a 
definite fraction of it and add to it in the same ratio; if 
now the successive added terms do not include one and the same 
magnitude, whatever it may be, we shall find that addition 
gives a sum tending to a definite limit”. It is not hard to 
see that Aristotle is describing here, no matter how awkwardly, 
a geometric series with common ratio less than one. But what 
is infinite about it? Certainly not the sum, as he himself, 
evidently, knows. The potential infinite lies in the endless 
succession of terms. And it is apparently a characteristic 
property of his ”potential infinite” that, no matter how many 
terms of it be taken, there are always some more left outside
a/of those taken. Hence, his next characterization: ”Not that
outside of which there is nothing, but that outside of lafoich 
there is always something, that is the infinite?1.
On the other hand, if the process is that of adding a 
finite magnitude, no matter how small, repeatedly to itself 
then (as was pointed out above) he knows that any finite 
magnitude will, some time, be exceeded. But, ”Not every 
definite magnitude can be exceeded, for there would be some­
thing, in that case, bigger than the heaven”. Hencehis con­
clusion that ”The infinite therefore cannot exist, even 
potentially, in the sense of exceeding every finite magnitude
as the result of successive addition”.
_ _
Physics. Ill, 807 a 1-2
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There is some confusion here, some vestige of Pythago- 
reanism perhaps, which somehow attaches physical mass to his 
conception of magnitude and thus prevents him from accepting 
even the possibility (potentiality) of "infinite magnitude". 
That this lack of abstraction may be the true cause of the 
difficulty here is supported by the fact that it would also 
explain why Aristotle is, none the less, ready to accept the 
sequence of the natural numbers as a "potential infinity"#
His acceptance of this infinity does not require him to accept 
an "infinite magnitude" also*
65Heath has discussed this question and found that 
Aristotle1s "potential infinite" is a convergent infinite 
series. The view advanced here is that the "potential infinite" 
is an "infinite sequence", provided the law of fbrmation of its 
successive terms does not ultimately lead to a contradiction 
of (rightly or wrongly) accepted truths. The proviso is 
legitimate, of course, though some of Aristotle1s accepted 
truths could stand revision.
Mr. Abraham Idel in his very interesting and quite
66plausible "Aristotle’s Theory of the Infinite" , goes a good 
deal beyond the view presented here. His thesis is (to the 
best of my understanding) that Aristotle’s "potential 
infinite" is a large generalization of the interpretation
given here, one that comes close to being, if stated
—
Elements of Euclid. Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1924
66 Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia 
University, New York, 1954
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abstractly, an embodiment of the Principle of Mathematical 
Induction# Because of its great inherent interest I try to 
render Mr# Ed61*8 thought more fully in Appendix II#
Aristotle9s treatment of continuity is not as fortunate.
His is not the conception of mathematical continuity, but
rather an intuitive one, with little abstraction, of the
continuity of sensible magnitude# It is explained, by
Aristotle, as a type of contiguity, which is itself a type of 
67succession# "••• things are called continuous when the 
touching limits of each become one and the same and are, as 
the word ( <rcr v ) implies, contained in each other;
continuity is impossible if these extremities are two99# His 
treatment, condensed and reordered, may be given as follows:
1: Things are said to be together# if they are 
in one place.
2: Things are in contact if their extremities 
are together.5: That is between which is reached by a thing before it reaches another.
4: A thing is in succession to another if between it and the other there is nothing of the same kind#5: A thing is contiguous to another if it is in contact with it and In succession to it#
6: Things are continuous if they are contiguous and if the extremities they have in contact 
are one and the same#
The definition is very unsatisfactory, of coirse. It 
makes use of many irrelevant notions, and it is hard to see, 
in (5) above, how a thing can be in contact with another and 
yet fail to be in succession to it. But,worst of all, it is 
impossible to form an adequate notion of the "things99 
employed in the definition. Eor since they have extremities,
67 Physics. Vol. 3, 277 a, 11-13
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they must have parts which are not extremities; now, if these 
parts are continuous, the whole definition becomes circular, 
and if they are discontinuous, the definition breaks down. 
However, Aristotle*s definition has the great merit of 
recognizing, explicitly, that the notion of order is 
fundamental in, and prior to the notion of continuity. His 
use of the phrases "between*, *ln succession to", are ample 




An anonymous scholiast on the fifth book of Euclid’s 
Elements (believed by Heath to be Proclus) tells us that ’’some 
say that this book, containing the general theory of proportion, 
which is common to arithmetic, music, geometry, in a word to 
all mathematical science, is the discovery of Eudoxus, the 
teacher of Plato”.
It thus appears that this important branch of Greek 
mathematics is, at least by this scholiast, definitely 
attributed to Eudoxus. But additional evidence, due to Archi­
medes and, though indirect yet very convincing, may be adduced.
In the letter to Dositheus prefixed to the treatise ”0n 
the Sphere and Cylinder”, Archimedes says: ”1 cannot feel any 
hesitation in setting them (i.e., these theorems) side by side 
both with my former investigations and with those of the 
theorems of Eudoxus on solids which are held to be most irre- 
fragably established, namely, that any pyramid is one third 
part of the prism which has the same base with the pyramid and 
equal height, and that any cone is one third part of the 
cylinder which has the same base with the cone and equal 
height. For, though these properties were naturally inherent 
in the figures all along, yet they were in fact unknown to all 
the able geometers who lived before Eudoxus and had not been
Taken by Heath (History of Greek Mathematics) from 
Euclid, Vol. V, p. 280, ed. Heiberg
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observed by any one".
Again, in the letter to Eratosthenes, prefixed to ‘•The 
Method*1, he says: **This is a reason why, in the case of the
theorems the proof of which Eudoxus was the first to discover,
namely that the cone is a third part of the cylinder, and the 
pyramid of the prism, having the same base and equal height, 
we should give no small share of the credit to Democritus who 
was the first to make the assertion with regard to the said
figure though he did not prove it**.
But, in the letter to Dositheus prefixed to “The Quadrature 
of the Parabola* Archimedes says: **... and for the demonstration 
of this property the following lemma is assumed, that * the 
excess by which the great er of two unequal areas exceeds the 
less can, by being added to itself« be made to exceed any 
finite area* * The earlier geometers have also used this 
lemma; for it is by the use of this same lemma that they have 
shown that circles <are to one another in the duplicate ratio 
of their diameters, and that spheres are to one another in the 
triplicate ratio of their diameters, and further that every 
pyramid is one third part of the prism which has the same base 
with the pyramid and equal height; also that every cone is 
one third part of the cylinder having the same base as the 
cone and equal height they proved by assuming a certain lemma 
afmlTflr to that aforesaid ...**
The lemma of the last quotation is given once again by 
Archimedes, as one of the assumptions used in the book on 
“The Sphere and Cylinder**, in the following form: **0f unequal
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lines, unequal surfaces, and unequal solids, the greater 
exceeds the less by such a magnitude as, when added to itself, 
can be made to exceed any assigned magnitude among those which 
are comparable with it and with one another” ♦
It is established then, on the strength of this evidence,
that Eudoxus gave the first irrefragable proof of certain
theorems on the pyramid and the cone by means of a certain
lemma similar to Archimedes* assumption. How, an examination
of these theorems, as preserved by Euclid in XII, 7 and XII, 10,
reveals that the proof is by the ”Method of Exhaustion” and
that this method involves, explicitly, the lemma (Euclid, X, 1).
”If there are two unequal magnitudes and from the greater is subtracted more than its half (or its half), and from the remainder is again sub­tracted more than its half (or its half), and if 
this is kept up continually there will be left some magnitude which will be Jess than the lesser of the two given magnitudes”,
a lemma which Euclid proves by the assumption that:
”By taking the lesser of two magnitudes it is possible, by multiplying it, to make it some 
time exceed the greater”,
an assumption which he seems to base on two definitions of 
Book V, which state that
A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of Def. 5. size between magnitudes of the same kind (
Def. Magnitudes are said to ha^a ratio to oneanother which are capable, when multiplied, 
of exceeding one another.
How similar Euclid’s assumption is to Archimedes’ may 
be seen from the following considerations.
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Let a and b be any two comparable magnitudes, with a < b. 
Then, there exists an integer n such that
(1) n • a > b, according to Euclid, while
(2) n. (b — a) > b, according to Archimedes*
Now, since a > o then b — a -c b whence, by (1), 
n *(b - a) > b, which is (2)* Again, since a ;> o then b -+■ a > b
whence, by (2), n #£(b + a) - b/ > b, that is, n ' a > b,
which is (1)*
And now, we may summarize the additional evidence that 
was to be adduced in support of Proclus* assertion concerning 
the authorship of Book V as follows* Archimedes asserted 
that Eudoxus gave the first irrefragable proof of the theorems 
concerning the volumes of the pyramid and the cone, by means
of a lemma similar to his own* These proofs, as preserved by
Euclid, involve an assumption which is similar (in fact, 
equivalent) to that of Archimedes, and this assumption makes 
its first appearance in Greek mathematics in Book 7* Hence, 
Eudoxus* connection with this book is established*
It will be noticed that this brief investigati on also 
establishes the fact that the axiom so often described as the 
••Axiom of Archimedes” in mathematical literature is due to 




TEE EODQXIAN THEORY OF PROPORTIONS
This theory cannot be described here in its entirety,
admirable though it is and Hin every respect superior to the
69algebraical method by which it is now generally replaced* ;
but such parts of the theory as are at all involved in the
object of this survey will be carefully examined.
The theory is founded on a number of definitions of which
70the most important are:
(1) A. magnitude is a part of a magnitude, the less of the greater, if it measures the greater,
(2) The greater is a multiple of the less when it is measured by the less,
A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of sl&e between two magnitudes of the same hind,
(4) Magnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another which are capable, when multiplied, of exceeding 
one another*
(5) Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third to the fourth when, if any equimultiples whatever be taken of the first and third, and any equimultiples what­ever of the second and fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or alike fall short of the latter equimultiples respectively taken in corresponding order*
(6) Let magnitudes which have the same ratio be called 
•proportional*
69 0, Henriei, F*R*S,, Geometry, Enc. Brit, Vol,X:382 
Werner Ed., New York, 1901
70 T,L* Heath, Elements of Euclid. Vol, 2
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(7) When, of the equimultiples, the multiple of the first magnitude exceeds the multiple of the second, but the multiple of the third does not exceed the multiple of the fourth, then the 
first is said to have a greater ratio to the second than the third has to the fourth.
Of these definitions (1) and (2) serve the purpose of
defining the word "multiple", used in (5) and (7); (6) is only
nominal and thus unnecessary. Definition (5) however is worse
than unnecessary; it is useless. For though it professes to
be a definition of "ratio*, it not only does not define this
notion mathematically (even if it does classify the notion
philosophically), but it also fails to impart to it any
properties whatever that could make it usable in a mathematical
system. However, no use is made of it in the theory, and it
is believed by many to be a later addition, probably by Theon
of Alexandria. Heath says: *It now appears certain this
71definition is an interpolation".
The list narrows down now to (4), (5) and (7), defintions
which have been copiously commented upon and variously
72interpreted through the ages. Thus, Pascal thought that by 
"magnitudes of the same kind* Euclid meant magnitudes pos­
sessing the Eudoxian property. But this is not acceptable 
since there is evidence to support the view that Euclid 
accepted certain magnitudes as being "of the same kind
c /( dvL0)fLPV )* even though they did not possess this property. 
For, in Book I he gives:
71 Benrici, Loc. cit.
72 /Blaise Pascal, Pensees« ed. W.F. Trotter, H.Y., 1910
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Def. 8 A plane angle is the inclination to one 
another of two lines in a plane which 
meet one another and do not lie irj a straight line.
Def. 9 And when the lines containing the angle 
are straight, the angle is called recti­linear,
in ifthich, it is seen, the first definition puts all plane 
angles in the same genus and the second distinguishes recti­
linear ones as a separate species, Then, in Book III, 16, 
he proves, after a fashion, that the angle a tangent to a 
circle makes with the circumference is less than any recti­
linear angle, a fact which shows that though he thought of 
these angles , horn-shaped) as being of the
same kind (at least in the matter of magnitude, since he 
compared them), he yet denied that they possessed the Eudoxian 
property. For, if they did possess this property then, for 
any hom-angle H, and any rectilinear angle R, we would have, 
by the Eudoxian property, n • H > R whence H > £ , which 
contradicts the theorem Euclid proved.
To allow therefore for this broader conception of "magni- 
tudes of the same kind”, which the above dicussion clearly 
shows Euclid had, the two definitions, (5) and (4), may now 
(as is, besides, quite permissible linguistically) be retrans­
lated as follows:
Def. 3 A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between certain magnitudes of the same kind.
Def. 4 Those magnitudes of the same kind are said to have a ratio to one another which are capable, 
when multiplied, of exceeding one another.
We have then, in the acceptance of these angles, a clear
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75instance of what Russell has ealled since then the "relative 
infinitesimal", the correlative of the "relative infinite",
7 4  7 5dealt with, in recent years, hy DuBois Reymond, Borel ,
and briefly by Klein, Kasner and others.
However, the concept of non-Eudoxian magnitudes apparently
did not lend itself to easy, intuitive understanding* For 
76Proclus , in commenting on the many classifications of the 
notion of "angle" made by previous philosophers —  for these 
had variously placed it in the categories of quantity, quality 
and relation —  rejects the opinion that angle is a magnitude, 
saying: "If it is a magnitude, and all finite magnitudes of the 
same kind have a mutual ratio, all angles of the same kind, 
that is, which exist in surfaces, will have a mutual ratio.
And hence the horn-shaped will have a ratio to the rectilinear* 
But things which have a mutual ratio may, by multiplication, 
exceed each other; and therefore it may be possible for the 
horn-shaped to exceed the rectilinear angle which, it is 
well-known, is impossible, since it is shown to be less than 
any rectilinear angle"*
There is no explicit indication that Eudoxus himself had 
such a braod conception of magnitude; but the mere fact that he 
took the trouble to state his assumption concerning certain
75 Russell, Principles of Mathematics, p* 552
74 p. DuBois Reymond, Infinitarcalcul. Hardy, Cambridge, 
tract #12.
75 /E* Borel, La Theorie de la Croissance, Paris, 1910
Commentaries on Euclid*s Book I, p. 141, Tr. T*Taylor, 
London, 1792
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magnitudes proves that he at least considered the broader 
conception, though he decided to have nothing to do with it*
It is not Unfair, I think, to see in this a retreat, due in 
part to Zeno*s criticisms. There is no explicit mention, as 
there is in the case of Archimedes, of the magnitudes of which 
Sudoxus made his assumption; but these turn out to be the same 
as those of Archimedes. For the jassu&ption is applied to lines, 
in Book Y, and to surfaces and solids in Book XII*
On the other hand, that the difficulties raised by Zeno 
were very skillfully circumvented by means of this assumption 
cannot be denied. Within the theory built up by Eudoxus, any 
magnitude (length, area, volume), no matter how small, can be 
surpassed in smallness, and any magnitude, no matter how large, 
can be surpassed in largeness. There is now no ultimate small 
and no ultimate large. The inconsistencies attacked by Zeno 
cannot now arise. Thus were banished the "points'* of the 
Pythagoreans, as constituent elements of magnitude, the 
"indivisibles" of the Atomists, and all infinite magnitudes 
from Greek mathematics.
This does not mean, of course, thatsll conceptions of 
infinity were rendered impossible by the adoption of the 
Eudoxian axiom, for, obviously, one could still arrive at it 
by induction (we have seen that Aristotle did), and without 
violence to this axiom, provided one did not include it in the
class with the finite. One could, for instance, perceive 
by means of some insight or principle that there are more than 
n magnitudes in a class, no matter what natural number n might
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be, and assert an infinity of magnitudes in that class, 
provided this infinity itself was not thought of as a member 
of the same class* In fact, something entirely analogous 
to this (except for the assertion of the infinity) was done 
by Euclid himself when, in regard to the totality of primes 
he said (Book IX, 20), “Prime numbers are more than any 
assigned multitude of primes”* There is no violence here to 
the Eudoxian axiom for though Euclid did state that (for 
convenience we denote the number of primes by N) N > n, for 
any natural number n, while the Eudoxian axiom asserts that 
for any two natural numbers, M* ,N*, where M* < N*, an n 
exists such that n*M* > N*, there is no contradiction, for 
Euclid did not put N in the class of natural numbers; the M 
of Euclid*s is not the N* of the axiom*
Euclid*s proof of this theorem was, of course, a credit­
able performance* Not so however his extreme cautiousness 
concerning the use of the word "infinite”* Eor consider hja 
evasiveness in the very enunciation of this theorem: ”The 
prime numbers are more than any assigned number of primes”* 
Not only does he apply the adjective "infinite” to this 
totality, but he even avoids reference to it as a "number”* 
Zeno*s criticisms were, indeed, effective*
That there was here an opportunity for the drawing of a 
valid definition of a certain type of infinity can be made 
clear by a brief examination of Euclid* s proof of the theorem 
in question* This is, in substance, as follows:
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Suppose the number of* primes is finite.Let these be a, b , . . . , . k. Form now the number (a b ....k) +  1. Then
Case I If this number is a prime, a new primehas been found, for it is, obviously, not any of a,b, . . • . . k*
Case II If it is not prime then it is divisible bysome prime, p say, which cannot be identical with any of a, b, . . k; for if It werethen it would divide (a b ...k), and since it also divides (a b .. .k) 1 by hypothesis,
it would divide the difference, or unity, which is impossible.
Hence, in either case a new prime has been found. This contradiction proves that the number of primes is not finite.
It is obvious that the principle of mathematical in­
duction is involved in this proof. For a discrete series is 
formed, \&ose terms are the successive primes, p^ , produced 
by Euclid*s process from an initial prime, 1 say. This 
process yields, after any term p^ its successor p̂ +z , 
which is either (l p, p, »...p„) ■+ 1, if this is a prime, or 
some prime divisor of it if it is composite; in either case, 
Euclid* s proof assures us that p„+, is a prime different from 
any of its predecessors. Now, the first term of the series is 
a prime; also, if the n^ is a prime, so is the (n -+ 1} .
Hence, every term of the series is a prime. But every term 
of the series has a successor; hence the series is infinite 
and thus the number of primes is infinite.
We note, incidentally, that this process cannot be used 
as an algorithm to obtain an endless succession of primes for 
no general way is known by which it can be decided, in every 
case, whether (p, p^ • ••p*?) + 1 is itself a prime or a 
product of new primes.
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It is now time to examine definitions (5) and (7) and, 
to this end, I consider next the sense in which the word 
"magnitude* is used fcy Euclid for, as can be seen, this concept 
is fundamental in these definitions.
From axioms stated and others actually used in the 
Elements. Euclid seems to assign, in general, the following
properties to any set of magnitudes, a, b, c, ... etc*, of the
same kind*
1) If a = b, b = c then a — c
Z) If a < b, b < c then a < e
3) Of the relations a<^b, a = b, a ;> b one and only one holds.4) a -+ b is a magnitude of the same kind as a and b5) If a < b then an n exists such that n-a > b (for lengths, areas, volumes)
6) If a and b satisfy (5) then a/b, b/a exist*
Properties (5) and (6) are introduced, as has been noted,
in Book V. And now, definitions (5) and (7) of Book 7 may be
stated as follows* Let a and b be magnitudes of the same kind, .
c and d magnitudes of the same kind (the second kind not
necessarily the same as the first); then
Def. 5 If, for every pair mf n of-the- whole numberswe have m a = n b according as m* c S n d thena/b = c/d*
Def* 7 If, for seme pair m, n of whole numbers we havem*a ^  n b but m c ̂  n d then a/b > c/d.
We note that properties (3) and (6) of the previous 
paragraph are assumed in these definitions. We note also the 
high degree of abstraction imparted to the notion of ratio by 
these definitions; a and b may be lengths, c and d areas, yet 
a/b =  c/d if Def. 5 is satisfied. The Eudoxian ratio was then 
entirely independent of the nature of the magnitude in terms
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of which it was expressed*
These definitions of "equality** and "inequality" of ratios 
were criticized in the past on the ground that they do not 
offer criteria which can be applied, in every given case, to 
decide whether a certain ratio is or is not equal to another# 
For definition 5 requires one to examine an infinity of pairs 
m, n, which is actually an impossible task, and definition 7 
requires one to find some pair m, n which, though it may exist, 
one may conceivably fail to find in a year's search* These 
objections will be recognized, of course, as the older counter­
part of the questions agitated more recently by Kronecker 
and still more recently by the "intuitionist school" under the 
leadership of Brouwer and Weyl*
77A* Be Morgan answers this criticism with the statement 
that "nevertheless, certain mathematical methods enable us to 
avoid this difficulty", and gives the following example in
a.
"If a series of parallels cut off consecutive 
equal parts from anyone line which they cut, they do the same from any other. This premised, suppose any two lines, OA, OB, and take a succession of 
lines equal to OA, OB, drawing through every point 
a parallel to a given line* Draw any other line,
77 Number and Magnitude, an Attempt to explain the 
5th Book of Euclid, London, 1836, p. 72
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OCD, intersecting all the parallels, from which 
the preliminary proposition shows that whatever 
multiple Oa is of OA, the same is Oc of OC; and whatever Oh is of OB the same is Od of OD. And if Oa be greater than, equal to, or less than Oh, Oc is greater than, equal to, or less than 
Od* Hence the definition of equal ratios applies precisely to the ,lines OA, OB, OC and OD which 
are, therefore,proportional* This gives the construction o f fBook VT, IS, or one analogous to it*"
tJQWriting to the same end, 0* Henrici shows, by the 
following example, how Euclid1 s definition of equality may 
yet be used* Eor greater clarity I underscore the theorems 
he uses as premises, and adjoin a figure, with references 
to it in parentheses, to illustrate his proof*
0
AmB,AA0 B
"Triangles of the same altitude are to one 
another as their bases, or if a and b are the bases, and d and the areas of two triangles which have the same altitude, then a/b = •
To prove this we have, according to def* 5, 
to show that:if ma > nb, then m* > n/? ,if ma = nb, then me* — nf l ,
if ma < nb, then me* < np ,
That this is true is, in our case, easily




bases in the same line. We set off the base a along the line containing the base m times; we then join the different parts of division 
(A% , A3 , • *» Aw) ) to the vertex and get m triangles all equal to^ . The triangle (0A« A^>) on ma as base equals, therefore, mcv . If we proceed in the same manner with the base b, 
setting it off n times, we find that the area of the triangle (0B<> B* ) on the base nb equals n/3 , the vertex of all triangles being the same.if two triangles have the same altitude. then their areas are equal if their bases are equal; hence ic< = n/3 if ma = nb, and if tfaeir bases are unequal, then that has the greater area vfliich is on the greater base? in other 
words, m<* ia greater than, equal to, or less 
than n/? according as ma is greater than, equal to or less than nb, which was to be proved”.
It is interesting to observe how again the difficulty of 
including an infinity within the scope of an assertion has 
been overcome by the intervention of a principle. We have met 
examples in which the principle used for this purpose was 
mathematical induction, but in the two instances just given 
the empowering principle is not mathematical induction. 
Consider either of these examples, Henrici*s say, and examine 
the premises used. Take the first, for example, and restate 
it thus: **If, for any two triangles having equal sides, etc.**; 
it is at once evident that the word any is significant; it is 
the clue to the principle sought.
Consider the class, X, of elements x. The phrase *any x* 
means * an element of X, no matter which*. Hence the statement 
*Any x has the property P* means
(A) If an element of X be taken, no matter which,it will be found to have the property P.
From this it is possible to infer, on a priori grounds
that
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(B) Every element of X lias tlie property P.
In the case where X is a finite class the truth of (B)
Can he shown to follow from that of (A) by the argument that
the elements of X ban be individually examined, and in such an 
examination no x can he found which does not have the property 
P for the finding of such an x would contradict (A), wnicn is 
supposed to he true*
In the case where X is infinite such an argument cannot 
he used to deduce (B) from (A) for the elements of X cannot he 
examined individually* But if X is an infinite class of the 
type known as a ’progression*, the truth of (B) can he deduced 
from that of (A) hy the principle of mathematical induction. 
For:
1: If the first element of X is taken it will he found
to have the property P, hy virtue of (A)*
2: If any x is taken, it has the property P, hy virtue 
of (A; again.
3: Any such x has a successor, since X is a progression.
4: If this successor is taken, it has the property P, 
hy virtue of (A)
5: Every element of X has the property P, hy the principle of mathematical induction.
But in the ease of other types of infinity (to which 
Mathematical induction does not apply) no means remains of 
asserting the property P for every member of the class 
except that -which proceeds through the ’ concept of X ’, the 
concept of which X itself is the ’ extension’ • This is the 
principle sought; it may he stated thus:
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(C) If the concept, C, whose class is X, impliesthe property p, then every member of X has the property P.
The validity of this principle has been disputed, as is
well known, by the in&uitionists and, especially, by the
finitists; and various contradictions now existing in the
theory of infinite numbers have been attributed to it. Thus,
79Brouwer insists that "The Komprehensions-axiom, by virtue 
of which all things which have a certain property are united 
to form an aggregate (Menge), even in the limited form used 
fey Sermelo, is inadmissible in founding the aggregate theory, 
or is at least unserviceable. Only in the constructive 
definition of aggregates is a trustworthy foundation of mathe­
matics to be found”. But the rejection of principle (C), even 
for classes which can be ordered by Zermelofs axiom, renders the 
principle of the excluded middle invalid for all infinite
classes except progressions. Brouwer does not hesitate; he
80rejects even this. ”0n this foundation” , he says, 
"particularly in the last half century, extensive false theories 
have been erected”. He (and Weyl) abandons traditional logie 
and holds that a proposition of any theory is false if it 
contradicts an axiom of the theory, true if what it asserts 
can be constructed, and indeterminate if it contradicts no 
axiom but has not been constructed yet. In interesting
79 I. Pierpont, Bulletin iimerican Mathematical Society,
XXXIVsbl
80 ibia. p ,* 53
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peculiarity of this logic is that a proposition cannot be 
proved to belong to the third class. Por, obviously, the 
assertion that the proposition will never be constructed 
cannot be proved directly; on the other hand, the indirect 
way, of showing that the hypothesis that it can be constructed 
leads to a contradiction, proves that the proposition is 
false, not indeterminate.
Whether the imputations made by these schools against the
established theories of the infinite are just or not is not
definitely known; for all that these schools have succeeded in
demonstrating is that the contradictions do not arise in these
infinities if these infinities are left strictly alone. And
81it must not be overlooked that new principles have been 
invoked by the opposing school of thought also, by the sup­
porters of traditional mathematics, -which eliminate the 
paradoxes and contradictions from the theory of aggregates,
without necessitating the abandonment of fully one half of the
82mathematics in existence. Russell , for instance, has shown 
that the principle "Whatever involves all of a collection cannot 
be one of the collection”, the principle on which his Theory 
of Types is based, removes the paradoxes and contradictions 
from these theories without destroying them.
There is no a priori reason, as yet, for accepting either 
of these two solutions of the difficulty in preference to the
81 e.g., The Hilbert School and the Axiomatic Method, See 
J. Pierpont, on. cit., p. 46-50
82 Principles of Mathematics, p. 523-528.
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other, and there cannot he until a complete theory of knowl­
edge becomes available* But pragmatic considerations urge 
that| until then, those solutions be preferred which remove 
the difficulty without destroying a large part of what is 
left* There must hot be another retreat before the infinite*
An interesting comparison may be made between the two 
principles, i*e., (C) above, and
(D) If in the progression X the first term hasthe property P, and if P is such that when 
any term, x, has the property its successor also has it, then every term of X has the property P*
0*2As Poincare pointed out, the fomer is not an instrument 
of discovery while the latter is. For, if knowledge is only 
of the •universal* then in asserting the property P of every 
member of X the former principle makes no discovery of new 
knowledge since the property P was already contained in the 
universal C* The latter however, proceeding from the 
observation of the property P in the particular, x (which is 
not knowledge), asserts it of the universal X (which is)*
83 fH* Poincare, The Foundations of Science* tr. G-.B* Halsted, 
New York, 1929. "Without doubt recurrent reasoning in mathematics and inductive reasoning in physics rest on different 
foundations, but their march is parallel, they advance in the 
same sense, that is to say, from the particular to the 
general", page 40."We can ascend only by mathematical induction, which alone can 
teach us something new", page 42*
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CHAPTER XI
THE EDDOXIAH HUMBER SYSTEM
It is time now to examine the number system that
Eudoxus constructed by means of the assumptions and definitions
we have finished considering. Concerning this number system 
84Heath says: "Max Simon remarks, after Zeuthen, that Euclid1 s
definition of equal ratios is, word for word, the same as Weier-
strass* definition of equal numbers. So far from agreeing in
the usual view that the Greeks saw in the irrational no number,
Simon thinks it is clear from Euclid V that they possessed a
notion of number in all its generality as clearly defined as,
nay almost identical with, Weierstrass* conception of it".
As if skeptical about this high opinion Heath continues thus:
"Certain it is that there is an exact correspondence, almost
coincidence, between Euclid*s definition of equal ratios and
the modem theory of Irrationals due to Dedekind", and offers,
in support of this view, the following demonstration*
"Dedekind arrives at the following definition of an.irrational number: *An irrational number, oi , is defined whenever a law is stated which will assign every given rational number to one and only 
one of two classes A and B such that
1: every number in A precedes any number in 
B,
Zx there is no last number in A and no first 
In B;the definition of being that it is the one number which lies between all numbers in A and
The Elements of Euclid, 2:125
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all numbers in B* • 85
Now let x/y and x*/y* be equal ratios in Euclid*s sense. Then x/y will divide all rational 
numbers into two groups A and B; x*/y* will divide 
all rational numbers Into two groups A* and B* •
Let a/b be any rational number in A, so that a/b x/y; then ay < bx. Blit Euclid* s definition asserts that in that case ay* < bx* also. Hence also a/b < x* /y*; therefore any number of group A is also a number of group A*♦
Similarly any number of group B is also a number of group B* ♦ For if a/b belong to B, then a/b >x/y and thus ay :>•bx. But in that case, by 
Euelid*s definition, ay* ^  bx*; therefore also a/b > x*/y*. Thus, in other words, A and B are co-extensive with. A* and B* respectively; therefore x/y =■ x* /y* according to Dedekind as well as according to Euclid.
If x/y, x*/y*, happen to be rational, then one of the groups, say A, includes x/y, and one of the groups, say A*, includes x’/y*. In this case a/b might coincide with x/y; that is, a/b =x/y which means that ay =  bx. Therefore, by Euclid*s definition, ay* =  bxf; so that a/b ~ x ’/y*. Thus the groups are again co-extensive. In a word then, 
Euclid* s definition divides all rational numbers into two co-extensive classes, and therefore defines equal ratios in a manner exactly corre­sponding to Dedekind*s theory”.
It will be observed, of course, that this demonstration 
of Heath*s does not establish a correspondence between Euclid’s 
definition of equal ratios and the modern theory of irrationals 
due to Dedekind but rather (and perhaps this is Heath’s 
meaning) between the definitions of equality in the two 
systems. But even thus, the correspondence exists in one way 
only, that Is, if two ratios are equal in Euclid’s sense then 
the real numbers determined by them are equal in Dedekind’s
The postulation of a real number corresponding to 
every such •’Cut” has been criticized by H. Weber and B. Russell; 
the ’’Cut” itself is now taken, by definition, as the real number.
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sense, but not conversely. How far the two systems are from 
being in exact correspondence and how far Simon* s estimate is 
from being a true one will be made clear in the analysis of 
the Eudoxian system that follows &
We recall the definition of a real number:
If the class, C, of the rational numbers is separated, in any manner, into two non-empty classes, A and B, such that1: any element of A is less than any element of B,2: A has no last element, then the separation determined by the classes A and B is a real number, rational if B has a first element, irrational if it has not.
We denote the number thus defined by the symbol (A, B) and, 
for greater convenience in the comparison to be made, we 
exclude from the class C the number zero and all negative 
numbers.
We show how that a Eudoxian ratio, a/b, effects a sepa­
ration of the rational numbers which is strictly analogous to 
the real number of the above definition. For, consider the 
class A of the rational numbers consisting of those for which 
ma > nb, and the class B of those for which ma ̂  nb. Let such 
a separation be denoted by the symbol A/B. It is to be shown 
that
M. Every A/B is also an (A,B)
1: Let n/m be any rational number; then eitherma nb or ma < nb; hence, n/m is either in
A or else in B.
2: Let n/m be any element of A and r/s any one ofB; then ma > nb and sa ^ rb. Hence, n/m < a/b < r/s,that is, n/m < r/s* Hence, any element of A is 
less than any element of B.
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3: Let a, b, be any two Eudoxian magnitudes of the same kind. Then an integer n exists such that na ^ b; hence l/n < a/b and thus A has at 
least the rational number l/n in it. Similarly, an m exists such that mb * a, whence m/l > a/b.Thus B has at least the element m/l in it.Therefore A and B are non-empty classes.
4: A has no last element. For, let n/m be any element of A; we show that an element of A, greater than n/m, exists.
Since n/m is in A, n/m < a/b and thus ma > nb; therefore ma - nb is a magnitude of the same kind as a and b and thus Eudoxian. Of course, so is mb. 
Hence, an integer k exists such that k(ma —  nb) > mb. From this it follows that
a) 1 A  <
And now, it is easily seen, the rational number n/m l/k, greater than n/m, is in A* For, from 
a) above
l/k < (ma — nb)/mb,
^ a n , whence< ¥ ~ a
S -y-i < ̂  , which was to he shown.
And now, from 1:, 2:, 3:, 4: above it follows that the definition of (A* B) is satisfied by A/B.
This concludes the proof.
We consider now the converse question,that is whether 
H. Every (A, B) is also an A/B.
We paraphrase this question thus: Is there, for every 
separation of the rational numbers in the Dedekindian sense, 
a Eudoxian ratio , a/b, which effects this separation?
The answer to this question depends on the nature of the 
magnitudes a, b, c, etc. But whether these possess the property 
needed to assure the existence of the ratio in question, or 
not, must ultimately be a matter for postulation rather than
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;proof • Hence the question to be answered reduces now to 
whether this postulation was made or not* It may be said that 
there is no mention of such a postulate in Greek mathematics, 
nor is there any indication of its use* On the other hand, 
it is fair, as will be shown, to think that an opportunity to 
formulate such a postulate did arise, but was not taken*
If we recall the statements of Eratosthenes, Theon of 
Smyrna and Proclus (p* £16 above) concerning proportion as the 
bond and common element of arithmetic and geometry, if we 
recall that incommensurable lines had already been discovered, 
that, in fact, the theory of proportion of Book Y was created 
for the express purpose of coping with incommensurables, 
finally, if we note, in the following very natural derivation 
of the definitions of "equality” and "inequality” used in this 
book, a derivation, moreover, which was most probably the one 
employed in arriving at the said definition, if we note that 
all that was needed was the assertion of the converse of an 
observed fact, it will be seen that the opportunity was there.
For suppose that two pairs of magnitudes, a,b, and c,d, 
which may be incommensurable, are given,,and the ratios a/b, 
c/d are formed. If these are to be equal, that is, if they 
are to be the same ratio (see Def. 5 above) then, as Is 
Intuitively demanded and as the analogy from the case of 
commensurable ratios suggests, if a/b is less than, equal to 
or greater than ratio, n/m, then so must the other ratio, c/d 
be less than, equal to, or less than n/m. In other words,
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if a/b < n/m then c/d < n/m,if a/b ~ n/m then c/d - n/m,if a/b > n/m then c/d ;> n/m,
from which the definition that was adopted, "a/b c/d if
ma ^ nb according as me > nd" naturally arises* And it is
obvious «—  too obvious to miss —- that each of these ratios,
a/b and c/d, leads easily to a separation of the numbers n/m
into two groups, to wit, the group of those that are greater
than it and that of those that are not# Hence, for two such
ratios the comparison between them might have been shown,
graphically, by means of two straight lines, thus:
*/t*i **/& nYn»'
—  -  . *
nfa cfa 7fs *Zm '
From this would arise also, quite easily, the definition 
of "greater than"* For, if a single ratio, r/s, lay between 
a/b and c/d, as shown in the figure, that is, if some r/s 
existed such that r/s < a/b but r/s ^ c/d then, obviously 
a/b > c/d. This, of course, would then be restated in the 
form given in Def. 7.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an easier or more 
natural approach to definitions 5 and 7 of Book V than the one 
outlined here. Therefore, it may be assumed that Eudoxus knew 
that any ratio separates the rational numbers into two mutually 
exclusive, and exhaustive groups. Hence, an easy opportunity 
was present to consider the possibility of the converse also 
and thus arrive at the postulate in question. As stated above, 
this opportunity was not seized by Eudoxus. On the other
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hand, he could not hafre been expected to either; for such a 
procedure would have been entirely foreign to the Greek habit 
of mind* As is, besides, illustrated in the number system 
Eudoxus constructed, the Greeks saw the magnitude first and 
then assigned a measure to it; they did not assert the existence 
of a magnitude to correspond to every measure*
It is important, however, to examine the consequences of
the postulate in question* Suppose then that we have not only
M Every A/B is an (A, B), as was proved above, but alsoN Every (A,B) is an A/B, by hypothesis.
It is easy to show that, in such a case, there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between the class of Dedekind Cuts 
and the class of Eudoxian ratios. For, let A,/B/ correspond 
to (A* , B* ) and let (At,, , B^ ) be any other Dedekind Cut.
Then, we show, A,/B/ does not correspond to it also. For, if 
it did, we would have:
a) every element of A \ is an element of A ̂ , by Ib) every element of At is an element of AJ , by M.e) every element of AV is an element of A*, , by a) and
b); againd) every element of B^ is an element of B/ , by Iff,e) every element of B/ is an element of B/ , by M.f) every element of Bi. is an element of BJ , by d)
and e).
Now, from c) and f) (AJ , B» ) —  (A± , BV. ), by the 
definition 86 of equality of Dedekind Cuts* But this is 
impossible, since, by hypothesis, (A^ , B^ ) is other than
(A* » B*, )• Hence, A, /&, cannot correspond to two distinct 
Dedekind Cuts. In a similar manner it can be shown that (A ,B)
86 W.F. Osgood, Function of a Real Variable. Peking, 1936
p. 47
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cannot correspond to two distinct Eudoxian ratios. Thus, the 
correspondence is one-to-one.
Further, in this correspondence, the rank of corresponding 
elements is preserved; that is, if A,/B, < A*/B^ then (A* , BJ)
< (A1,. , )♦ For, suppose that A,/B, < k j e z % then, for some
m, n, ma, < nb, and ma*. ? nb*. » whence a//b, < n/m but 
a f  n/m. From this it follows that B* contains a rational 
number, n/m, not in BV 5 hence, by the definition of "less than* 
for Dedekind Cuts, (Af, , Bf, ) < , BV )•
It follows from the last two results obtained that if the
assumption N. is made the system of Eudoxian ratios becomes a
87linear continuum; for it has been shown to be a series whose
class is In one-to-one correspondence with the class of real
88numbers and ordinally similar to it*
Yet, the Eudoxian continuum created with the help of this 
assumption Is, in an essential respect, different from the 
Dedekindian continuum. For, if, according to the assumption, 
to every real number there corresponds a ratio a/b such that 
d  = a/b then, letting b be the unit of magnitude, c** b = a, 
that is, to every real number ^  there corresponds a magnitude 
of measure <=< • Hence, the assumption imparts to the geometric 
magnitudes a, b, . * • themselves the continuity of the Dede­
kindian system. If now, in this last result, the magnitudes 
a b, • • ♦ be regarded as geometric lengths, the assumption9 *
on E*V* Huntington, The Continuum as a Type of Order. 
Harvard Press, 19S1
88 Cantor, on. eit.» p* 112.
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reduces to the Dedekind-Cantor axiom, concerning the geometric 
line.
On the other hand, If the assumption is not made the 
Eudoxian system is not a continuum (it is shown in Appendix XIX 
that it is a dense series). Further, this difference exists 
between the two systems: the Eudoxian is geometric in 
character, and dependent on the postulate N* if it is to be 
continuous. The Dedekindian is purely arithmetic, and in­
dependent of this postulate for its continuity.
89As is wellknown, Dedekind* s purpose in the creation of
the arithmetic continuum was to free analysis from all dependence
on the notion of “measurable magnitude”, and other notions
90foreign to arithmetic. For, as Bussell puts it, “Weierstrass,
Dedekind, Cantor and their followers pointed out that if
irrational numbers are to be significantly employed as measures
of quantitative fractions (measurable magnitudes) they must be
defined without reference to quantity (magnitude)“. To the
91same effect, but more specifically, Dedekind writes “All the 
more beautiful it appears to me that without any notion of 
measurable magnitudes and simply by a finite system of simple 
thought-steps man can advance to the creation of the pure 
continuous uumber-domain; and only by this means in my view 
Is it possible for him to render the notion of continuous space 
clear and definite?1.
89 B. Dedekind, Essays on ffumber. page 2, Chicago, 1924
90 Principles of Mathematics, p. 157
91 Dedekind, op. cit. p. 38
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Thus did Eudoxus cools within an ace of creating a con­
tinuum of ratios, and thus did Dedekind, twenty-two centuries 
later, brilliantly achieve his superior, purely arithmetic 
continuum, by taking up the problem where Eudoxus had left it# 
The discussion of the preceding pages has, undoubtedly, revealed 
the close connection between the two systems; to this can be 
added the following frank admission, by Dedekind, of his 
indebtedness to Eudoxus#
11 • . • an irrational number is defined by the specification of all rational numbers that are less and all those that are greater than the number to be defined # • • this manner of determining it is already set forth in the clearest possible way in the celebrated definition of the equality of two 
ratios (Elements, Y f 5)# This same most ancient conviction has been the source of my theory as well as that of Bertrand and many other more or less complete attempts to lay the foundations for the 
introduction of irrational numbers into arithmetic”#
The comparison of the two number systems given above was
hot meant, of course, to place them on the same level of
excellence, nor should it be allowed to obscure the fact that
95the Eudoxian system was woefully ineosqplete. This system 
contained all the rational numbers, all the algebraic ir­
rationals of the quadratic and the biquadratic (the twenty-five 
species of the tenth book of Euclid), an infinity of algebraic 
irrationals of order 2n (the infinite sequence of medials of 
Book X, 115), and the transcendental ^(though its trans- 
oendentality, or even incommensurability was not definitely 
known); but it still Hacked most of the algebraic irrationals
92 ibid95 See also H#B. Eine, "Ratio. Proportion and Measurement 
in -Euclid” . Annals of Mathematics, XIX: 1917#
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and all (with the sole exception noted) the transcendentals 
which are, of course, by fax the biggest part of the real 
number system*
As a consequence of this incompleteness not all the mathe­
matical operations could be performed in this number system*
In particular, an infinite sequence of ratios, a», • • «
a*, • • » rational or not, which satisfied Cauchy’s criterion 
of convergence, |art+n, - a^f^, n ^ H, did not necessarily have
a limit in this system* However, it is very unlikely that this 
defect inconvenienced Greek mathematicians at all. Greek 
mathematics had, by this time, taken a definite trend away from 
considerations of infinities and limits (the effect of Zeno’s 
criticisms noted above) and had substituted for them consider­
ations of simpler concepts, clearer and easier to grasp 
intuitively, and methods that could be applied with greater 
confidence. The Eudoxian number system was itself but a 
reflection of the mathematics of the time. Thus, though the 
question raised above could not arise, one that could, that was 
In fact substituted for it, was the converse question, that is, 
the question whether, for any ratio, a/b, of definite value 
and assumed (on intuitive or other grounds) to exist, approxi­
mations of definite value and arbitrarily close to the assumed 
one did or did not exist in their number system.
It can be shown that the Eudoxian number system, with the 
help of the Eudoxian axiom, was sufficient to guarantee the 
existence of such approximations. To this end we prove the 
following theorem.
"For any Dedekind Cut, (A, B), If it be assumed that there exists a Eudoxian ratio, a/b, determining the Eudoxian separation, A/B, then there exists a Eudoxian ratio, a*/bf, such that 
I a/b — af/B*| < <y where & is any Eudoxian ratio" ,
Let the rational Eudoxian ratio G be such that ;
s u c h  p.that there exists,, an e is assured by the fact that o  effects
a separation of the rational numbers into two classes, and as
was proved above, each of these has at least one element in
It,
Let n//my be an element of A and n^/m^ an element of B; 
then nj/m* ? n ;/m, and thus n/m s (n̂ /m̂ . - n,/m, ) > 0,
If n/m < g we choose a* = (n; nz)u, b* = (m,+ mju, 
where u is the unit of magnitude, and form the ratio a?/B*
„  In ,  +  nju that is a V V ^  S,1.,i'JSsSs , as the required ratio, (m, + »*ju 9 m/ t-
As is easily verified 2' < -t. 2?. < 2^* m.f m f i- ma m.2.
Now, the ratio afb* thus formed is either in A or in B,
We consider these cases separately.
Case 1, Let a'/b* *>6 M  1511611 S ’ < n> + < 2 ̂  2*- hence
Mi m ; ■+■ m* b ’
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Case 2. Let af/bf be in B; then n» < a < n,+ n^ < nz kence
ii 1> ' m Ty- m •* mi
a’ a ,n*- a < 2Ll-±-Sz--SrTa* m a " m» •+ m, m /
< Pa-Eij — niffli _ _ n,m, m-2. ~ m-z, m i
< € <cP.
Hence, in either case, )a/b — af /b*/
If, however, n/m J ̂  , we choose y , such that 0
whence also ^  < n/m. By the Eudoxian axiom a k exists such
that w y/jA. > n/m whence n^/m* - n/m, = n/m < k * , or
nt/i2 < n, /m, -+- k • v/^t « We form the sequence of rational 
numbers;
(A) n./ffl, , n./m, -f ,n,/m( + 2 ^  . . . . n,/m, +  r ^  , 
. . .  n,/m,+k and note that some of the elements of (A)
are in A and some in B. Let n,/m, +- r * >/̂ t be the last of
those in A; then n»/m, -t (r !)• ^  is in B. Let now
3$ , M t - n,/mr r ^  , N*/ta2 =n,/mf ^ (r ^ 1) ; we have
- N , M ,  = n,/m, + (r +1) , ^ - n , / ! , -  r ^  ^  < 6<oC 
We choose a* = (M , +  bf — (M , + Mju, we fom
a1/b* = consider» precisely as before, the
case where ft1 /bf is in A and that Tidiere it is in B. We find 
again, in either case, / a/b —  a* /h* I  < c f which completes 
the proof.
In what is to follow this theorem will be referred to, for 
convenience, as the Existence theorem; the name is justified by 
the fact that for any a/b and any Eudoxian ratio </* , the 
Budoxian ratio a*/*** is shown by this theorem to exist.
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CHAPTER XII
OEE METHOD OF EXHAUSTION
It will be recalled that in tracing the authorship of the 
fifth book of Euclid to Eudoxus we discovered that the "first 
irrefragable proof" of the theorems that Archimedes assigned 
to Eudoxus was effected by the method of exhaustion; it may 
be taken then that, at least in the form found in Euclid, this 
method of proof is due to Eudoxus* However, an earlier and 
less perfect form of the method seems to have existed before 
Eudoxus; for, Simplicius, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics, preserves the following extract from ludemus* History 
of Geometry*
"Antiphon, having drawn a circle, inscribed in it - one of those polygons that can be inscribed; let it be a square. Then he biseeted each side of this square and through the points of section drew straight lines at right angles to them, producing them to meet the circumference; these lines evi­dently bisect the corresponding segments of the circle* He then joined the new points of section to the ends of the sides of the square, so that four triangles were formed, and the whole inscribed figure became an octagon* And again, in the same way, he bisected each of the sides of the octagon, and drew from the points of bisection perpendiculars; he then joined the points where these perpendiculars 
met the circumference with the extremities of the octagon, and thus formed an inscribed figure of sixteen sides. Again, in the same manner, bisecting the sides of the figure of sixteen sides and drawing straight lines, he formed a polygon of twice as many sides; and doing the same again and again until he had- exhausted the surface, he concluded that in this manner a polygon would be inscribed in the circle, 
the sides of which, on account of their minuteness, would coincide with the circumference of the circle.But we can substitute for each polygon a square of tqual surface; therefore we can, since the surface 
coincides with the circle, construct a square equal
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to a circle”•
Simplicius remarks, quoting Eudemus to the same effect, 
that the inscribed polygon would never coincide with the 
circumference of the circle, even if it were possible to carry 
the division of the area to infinity, since to suppose that it 
would set aside a geometrical principle which asserts that 
geometrical magnitudes are divisible ad infinitum*
94A contemporary of Antiphonfs, Bryson of Eeraclea, 
extended this method by circumscribing polygons about the circle 
at the same time that he inscribed others, thus obtaining an 
upper limit also to the area of the circle; he made the mistake 
however, of thinking that the arithmetic mean of the inscribed 
and circumscribed polygons was the area of the circle*
From these simple origins was evolved the justly famous
method of Eudoxus, the method which, as improved and brilliantly
used by Archimedes, could well be called the Greek Integral
Calculus* How far beyond these origins this calculus went,
what levels of logical rigor it attained and how close it came
to the modern integral calculus will be made clear in the study
that follows* But also in what respect these two calculi
remained essentially distinct will be made equally clear; the
95views expressed by Heath, in the following quotation , 
concerning the Greek attitude toward the infinite and the 
infinitesimal should be observed*
04.Cajori, History of Mathematics« p* 23 
Works of Archimedes * Cambridge, 1897, p cxlii
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"The time had not come for the acceptance of Antiphon9s idea, and, perhaps as a result of the dialectic disputes to which the notion of the infinite gave rise, the Greek geometers 
shrank from the use of such expressions as * infinitely great9 and 9infinitely small9 and substituted the idea of things 9gr@ater or less than any assigned magnitude9. Thus, as Eankel says, they never said that a circle is a polygon with an infinite number,, of infinitely smai 1 sides; they always stood still before the abyss of the infinite and never ventured to overstep the bounds of clear conceptions. They never spoke of an infinitely close approximation or a limiting value of the sum of a series extending to an infinite numberrof terms.99
That the notions of infinity, limit, infinitely close 
approximation and so forth had been met, and that some of these 
had been conceived with sufficient clarity to be used in 
mathematical computations or demonstrations has been shown in 
the preceding pages. But to those of the Greek mathematicians 
(as Eudoxus, Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius) who paid attention 
to definiteness of result, clarity, and rigor of demonstration 
the use of these notions remained prohibited unless, as in the
lesscase of Archimedes, other,„objectionable means were gvailable
96for the logical demonstration. Thus, quoting from Heath again,
"Yet they must have arrived practically at such a conception, e.g., in the case of the proposition that circles are to one another as the squares of their diameters, they must have been in the first instance led to infer the truth of the proposition by the idea that the circle could be regarded as the limit of an inscribed regular polygon with an indefinitely increased 
number of correspondingly small sides. They did not, however, rest satisfied with such an inference; they strove after an irrefragable proof, and this, from the nature of the case, could only be an 
indirect one. Accordingly we always find, in proofs by the method of exhaustion, a demonstration that
96 Heath, loc. cit.
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an impossibility is involved by any other 
assumption than that which the proposition main­
tains, Moreover, this s£ingent verification, by means of adouble reductio ad absurdum, is repeated in every individual instance of the use of the method of exhaustion; there is no attempt 
to establish, in lieu of this part of the proof, any general propositions which could be simply quoted in any particular dase."
The method of exhaustion existed in two forms; as origi­
nated by Eudoxus (and as found exclusively in Euclid) it 
involved the construction of inscribed figures only in the 
surface or solid whose measure was to be found. But as 
improved by Archimedes (and as used by later writers) it invol­
ved the construction of circumscribed figures also in relation 
to the one whose measure was sought. The inscribed and the 
circumscribed figures are then allowed, by increasing the 
numbers of their sides, to approach coincidence with each other 
and with the figure whose measure is sought. But, it must be 
understood, Archimedes does not describe his method in this 
way; nor does he say at any time that the given figure is the 
limiting form of the inscribed or the circumscribed figure.
The resemblance of this procedure of Archimedes* to the 
modern conception of the integral is, of course, striking. 
Heath does not hesitate to say nhe (Archimedes) performs 
genuine integrations". Paul Tannery also, after describing 
the first method, as found in Euclid, considers the extended 
method and says "The second, due to Archimedes, consists in 
summing values of a function corresponding to values of a 
variable in arithmetic progression; by multiplying by the
97 Notions Historiques, Paris, 1903, p, 340.
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constant difference the successive values of the variable, 
and by supposing the constant difference to decrease 
indefinitely, the quadrature is thus obtained directly by 
passing to the limit* This second method corresponds to the 
Leibnizian conception of the primitive of the function f (x) 
as Jf(x)ax".
Such ate Heathfs and Tannery’s views of this method; 
however, it will be maintained, and made clear, in the full 
description and analysis of the method to be given now that, 
because of the Greek attitude toward the infinite and the 
infinitesimal described above, Archimedes never even attempted 
to effect a quadrature by "passing to the limit", or "perform 
a genuine integration", if, by this phrase, Heath meant an 
integration in the modern sense. Further, it will be shown 
that, because of the defect in the Greek number system revealed 
in the study of the previous chapter, Archimedes could not have 
passed to a limit, even if he had attempted it, for the 
Eudoxian number system, in which this method operated, could 
not guarantee the existence of such a limit, nor was its 
existence ever asserted by postulation. In fact, to assume 
that Archimedes ever proceeded in this manner is to do 
injustice to his well-known sense of logical rigor. On the 
other hand, it will be shown that the form Eudoxus and 
Archimedes gave their method was largely determined by the 
nature of the medium in which it was to operate and that, for 
such a medium, no better method could be invented.
The following examples of the use of this method,
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selected from Euclid and Archimedes but; presented here in more 
or less modernized notation will be found useful both for an 
understanding of the method itself and the analysis that is 
to follow*
077 eThe first one is the., mentioned by Heath in the first 
quotation above! it is Prop* 2, Booh XII, Euclid* It is 
attributed by Heath to Eudoxus because the proof is exactly 
like those used in the theorems on the volumes of the pyramid 
and the cone, theorems known to be due to Eudoxus*
Proposition: Circles are to one another as the squares on the diameters*
Let S be a circle and AB the side of an inscribed 
regular polygon, P, * Bisect are AB at C, draw a tangent to 
S at C and raise the perpendiculars AB, BE to it, to form the 
rectangle ABED* Draw AC and BC*
The, we clearly have ̂  ACB = p e
1/2 c=u ABED > 1/2 ACB •
Hence, if Pa. is the inscribed 
regular polygon of side AG,
S - Pa <  1/2(S - P, ); 
similarly S - P3 <  1/3(8 ~ P*), 
and so on* Hence, by Sue. X, 1 
(see p# above), a polygon,
, exists such that S —  Pv,
98is less than any assigned area*
Let now S and S* be the areas of two given circles and
QQ The Dependence of Euclid f , 1 on the Eudoxian axiom 
should be observed*
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let d and d* be their respeetiire diameters* It is to be proved 
that
(1) s/s» = a2/**2
If (1$ is not true let A be an area sueh that
(2) a V d ’ = S/A,
•where either A < Sf or A > Sf,
Case 1* Suppose that A < Sf.
Construct polygons^the manner described above, in S' until 
a polygon, P„* , is reached such that Sf — Pi < Sf - A,
whence also
(5) A <PJ, *
Inscribe in S a polygon, P„ , similar to Pi, ; then
f„/p* = a V a 2 "=. S/A . , by (2) above, hence
(4) P^/S - Pi/A.
Now, Ptf < S, since P„ is inscribed in S; therefore, from (4), 
we must have P^ < A; but this is impossible, by (3) above* 
Therefore case 1 is impossible.
Case 3* Suppose that A > S’. Then from (2) above
(5) a,2/az = a/S;
Let Af be such that A/S - S*/Af; then, from this and (5)
(6) d/Z/dz = S'/A* 
where, since S* < A we have
(7) A* < S.
Construct polygons in S until a P^ is reached such that
s " "Py, < s — A* ,
(8) A’ ^ P», •
Inscribe inS* a polygon, Pi, , similar to P^ ; then
99
(9)
pj, /p„ - a* /a*= S’/A1 , by (6) above, hence
PJL /S* - P^/A? *
Now, P*̂  < S* , since Pi* is inscribed in S*; therefore, we 
must have P^ < A 1, by (9) above; but this impossible by (8) 
above* Hence Case Z is impossible* It follows then that 
A = S* and thus, by means of (2), that (1) is true*
The ne±t example is selected from Archimedes; it is 
Prop* X, "On the measurement of the circle^*
Proposition: The area of any circle is equal to h right* angled triangle in which one of the sides about the right angle is equal to the radius, and the other to the circumference of the circle*
Let S be the area and 0 the circumference of the given 
circle, and T the area of the triangle described* Then, if 
S T either S < T or S > T*
Case 1* Let S > T*
Inscribe polygons in S until a polygon, P^ , is reached99
99 As proved in Euc* XXI* 2 - the Eudoxian axiom again,
10149 *
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such that B - P„ < S —-T, whence also
(1) T < P^ .
Let BA. he the side of P.̂  , p its perimeter, OK the perpen­
dicular on the foxmer from the center* Then, ON is less than 
B, the radius, and p is less than 0; hence P^ < T, which 
contradicts (1) • Hence this case is impossible.
Case 2, Let S < T.
Circumscribe a polygon, P, , about S and let two adjacent
sides, touching the circle at B and H, meet in L. Bisect the
arcs between adjacent points of contact and draw the tangents
at the points of bisection to foxm the new polygon P*. , Let
A be the middle-point of arc BH, and FAG- the tangent at A.
Then, the angle LAO is a right angle, whence 10 >  GA and thus
LG > GH. It follows that ^  FLO > 1/2(area LEAH) and thus
P^ - S < 1/2(P/ - S); similarly, P3 - S < l/2(Pa - S), and
100so on. Hence, by Eue. X, 1, there exists a such that 
P̂ , — S is less than any assigned area.
/Let polygons then be circumscribed about S until one, , is 
reached such that PI, - S ^ T —  S, whence also
(2) P*v, < T
Let FG be the side of PJU , p' its perimeter, and 0A the 
perpendicular on FG from 0. Then 0A = R and p* > C; hence 
> t, which contradicts (2). Therefore this case also is 
impossible. It follows then that 8 ==T, which was to be 
proved«
100 See Footnote 98.
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The next, and last, example chosen is Archimedes* 
quadrature of the area bounded by one turn of the spiral 
r = aQ and the line 9 - 0 *  The area is shown to be one third 
of the area of the circle r = 2^a and the proof rests on 
the following two lemmas*
Lemma 1* (Prop. 10, On Spirals)*
If A, , Az, A 3, * « * * A,? be n lines foiming an arithmetic 
progression in which the common difference is equal to i, ,
the least term, then
% 1 *1. *2.Atj ^ 3* (A* A a. ~h • * * • JL-h ), andn • AV\ ^ 3 ( A*, A ̂  ̂  A»w) •
4
Corollary* The results hold if similar plane figures are substituted for squares.
Lemma 2* (Cor. to prop. 21, 22, 23, On Spirals).
a) A figure can be circumscribed to the area of a spiral such 
that it exceeds the area by less than any assigned area*
b) A figure can be inscribed in it such that the area 
exceeds it by less than any assigned area*
The proof of the first lemms may be omitted as unessential
to this study; it is enough to say that Archimedes proves it 
by means of n straight lines whose lengths are in arithmetic 
progression. The proof of the second one may be summarized 
as follows.
Given one complete turn of the spiral OP, P2 
draw a circle with eenter 0 and radius 0 Pn; bisect this 
circle and then bisect the halves, and then the quarters, and
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so on, until a sector ZOBv, is obtained, less than any
assigned area (Archi­
medes here uses the 
Eudoxian axiom, 
n - a > b, in the form 
b/n < a)*
Then, by means of arcs 
£r of circles, AP, a,
BP^b, CP*e, etc., con­
struct the circumscribed 
figure DAP, BP* C• .P^ and 
the inscribed figure 
OP, aPxbB,c..y.
It is clear that the 
difference between the two figures is the sectcr^OE^ , which 
is less than any assigned area. Hence, since the area of the 
spiral is intermediate in magnitude between these figures, 
each of these differs in magnitude from the area of the 
spiral, a fortiori, by less than any assigned area. It should 
be noticed that the radii OP, * OP2. , • • • • OP-n are n lines 
in arithmetic progression, and that the common difference is 
0Pf , the least term.
Archimedes* proof of the theorem may be given now as 
follows. Let C be the area of the circle (see figure), and 
S the area of the spiral. It is to be shown that S =  l/3 C,
If S =*= 1/5 C then either 6 < 1/5 C or S > 1/3 C.
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Case 1, Suppose that S <1/3 C*
Circumscribe the figure, P, about the spiral, making
P — S <r 1/3 C — S whence also
(!) P <  1/3 C.
But n-QPjj < 3(OP, + QP* + * « * * + OB^) whence, substituting 
similar sectors for the squares, C < 3P, that is, P >1/3 C, 
which contradicts (1) above* Therefore this case is impossible*
Case 3* Suppose that S >1/3 C*
Inscribe the figure, f, in the spiral, making S — f <: S - 1/3 C, 
whence also,
(S) f > 1/3 C.
 ̂ . 2. s. zBut n OPv, > 3(OP, + OP* -+- • • « *f-0P„» 1) whence, substituting 
similar sectors for the squares, c > 3f, that is, f < 1/3 C, 
which contradicts (2) above* Therefore this case also is 
impossible*
Since S cannot be either greater or less than 1/3 C it must 
be equal to it*
It will be convenient to present, in the form of a lemma, 
a line of reasoning which is fundamental in the method of 
exhaustion*
3lLemma* Let^ratio, a/b, be assumed to exist, and let c/d be a 
Eudoxian ratio* Thus, a/b is merely known to exist; 
c/d is known in value also*
Bow, (see H, I, Appendix III)
a) One and only one of the following relations holds:
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a/b > c/d, a/b = c/d, a/b <  c/d, 
and, by the existence theorem,
b) Given any ratio, §  , a ratio p  exists such that j  a /h  -  ̂  < cP
If it be assumed now that a/b > c/d then, letting 
<p, = a/b — c/d a ratio,r, exists, by (b), such that
c) a/b - r < eO •
If it be assumed that a/b < c/d then, letting <PZ -c/d - a/b, 
a ratio, R, exists, by |b), such that
d) R - a/b
And now, if it can be shown that r satisfies the relation
e) r < c/d
and R the relation
f) R > c/d
then a/b — c/d.
For, from (c), a/b - r < a/b — e/d, whence c/d < r; but 
this is impossible, by (a), in view of (e).
Again, from (d), R — a/b < c/d — a/b, whence R < c/d; 
but this is impossible, by Ja), in view of (f).
Therefore, the assumptions a/b > c/d and a/b < c/d are 
both false. Hence, by (a), a/b = c/d.
It will be convenient, also, to make some provision for 
the fact that in some of the applications made of this method 
the investigation is about ratios while in others it is about 
absolute magnitudes. Thus, in the first example presented 
above a ratio was to be found, while in the second and third, 
absolute magnitudes. This difference may be allowed for
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either by treating ratios of magnitudes as magnitudes (of a 
different kind), or by treating Archimedes1 magnitudes as 
ratios, by considering in their place numerical ratios with 
denominator 1* The latter course will be adopted here, as 
permitting the continued use of the voeabulaiy employed thus 
far*
The analysis of the method, for the general case, may 
now be given as follows.
Let X be the geometric figure to be measured and a/b its 
measure, assumed to exist but unknow as yet.
Let c/d be a ratio, known in value, adopted as an 
estimate of a/b. Let f* be the measure of a figure inscribed
in X and that of a figure circumscribed about X.
Then, the proof that a/b = c/d can be analyzed into the 
following steps.
1) f^ < a/b < F^ , for any n, by assumptions 1 - 4 ,  Sphere 
an$ Cyl., 1.
2) f ~ < c/d ^ F^ , for any n, by individual proof in each 
case.
3) For any J) an r exists such that a/b — r < cP, , by the
existed theorem.
4) For any S*. an R exists such that R - a/b < Jl , by the
same theorem.
5) If a/b > c/d then a./b - c /d  is chosen for J ] and fn for 
r; it follows from (3) that c/d < f^ , which contradicts 
(2).
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6) If a/b «< c/d then e/d —  a/b is ehosen for J ] and for 
R; it follows from (4) that F„ < c/d, whieh contradicts
(2)*
7) From (5) and (6) it follows that a/b = c/d , by the lemma*
That the examples presented above fall into the general 
pattern of this analysis is easy to show*
Thus, in the first example, it was shown that S ' / S ■=■ d* /d^ * 
Here Sf/S is the ratio a/b and A/S, equal to df*/d^ , is the 
ratio c/d* Denoting by pi and Pi the polygons inscribed and) 
circumscribed, respectively, in S* , then pi, /S and VK, /& are 
the ratios and F^ respectively*
We have:
1) Pit /S < Sf/S < PtxS, by assumptions 1 — 4, not stated inEuclid explicitly but used nevertheless*
s) p!*/s < A/S <r Pi, S, by proof, as follows:
Let plx be inscribed in S1 (as shown by Euclid) and let p^ , similar to pi, , be inscribed in $* Then, pi, /p^^d^/d2- 
(^A/S). But S; hence
Pi, /s ^ p V/ p», = V s .
Again, let Pi< be circumscribed about 
Sf (as shown by Archimedes), and let I» , similar to Pi, , be circumscribed about S. Then Pi, /B+, ^ d fV d z ( ̂ -A/S) * 
But Pv, ^ S; hence Pi, /S > Pi, /P^ - A/S/
3) s1 /S — r < , by the existence theorem*
4) R - S' /S < , by the same theorem*
5} If S'/S A/S, let J ls  S'/S - A/S and r = p', /S. Theq, from(3), S«/S - pi, /S < S'/S -  A/S, whence 
a/s < P’̂/S, which contradicts (2).
6) If S*/S •< A/S, let J2 = A/S — S'/S and B = P̂ , /S. Then, frai*(4) , PJt, /S -S'/S < A/S —  S'/S, whence 
Pi, /S <A/S, which contradicts (2),
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7) From (5) and (6) we have, by the lemma, S*/S = A/S (=a*/dl),
Q,*6»d*
It must be pointed out, however, that though, for the 
purpose of this analysis, the contradiction in step (6) was 
revealed by means of circumscribed polygons, the procedure 
followed by Eudoxus was entirely different* He used, instead, 
the following device*
If S’/S < A/S ( = d’V O ,  lot A’/S’ ~ d 7 a f*' , whence also A/S = S’/A1* Then, S’/S < S’/A’ (~d’Vd*) and thus, by taking reciprocals, S/S’ > A ’/S* where A’/S’ ~ dVd’2- *
It is seen that this device converts the hypothesis of 
step (6), for the circles S’, S, into the hypothesis of step
(5) for the circles S, S’; since the latter was shown to 
involve a contradiction, the former does also* This device 
is characteristic of all of Eidoxus’ proofs preserved in 
Euclid; he seems to have based his method on intiphon’s idea 
(of inscribing figures) exclusively* Bryson’s addition to 
this idea does not appear once in Euclid*
In the second example it was to be shown that S, the area
of the cirele, known to exist but unknown in value, is equal 
to the area T, of the triangle described, known in value also* 
Hence, S is the ratio a/b, T the ratio e/d, and jr , ^  , the 
areas of the inscribed and circumscribed polygons, respectively, 
are the ratios f v, and *
We have:
1) ® hy assumptions 1— 4 Sphere and Cylinder, 1*
Z) p^ < ̂  < hy proof, as given on page 100above.
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3} For any f , a ratio r exists sueh that S — r < di , by the 
existence theorem*
4) For any c$l a ratio R exists such that R — S < &L , by the 
existence theorem#
5) If € > T, let cC~ S — T and r = p̂ ,; then, from (3),
S — < S - T, whence T < ph, a contradiction of (2)#
6) If S < T, let J l  = T — S and R - p,,; then, from (4),
P-n - S < T - S, whence Pv, < T, a contradiction of (2)#
7) From (5) and (6 ) it follows, by the lemma, that 8 = T, q#e#d#
Finally, in the third example, it was to be shown that 3, 
the area of the spiral, known to exist but unknown in value, 
is equal to 1/3 C, where 0 is the area of the circle, known 
in value also# Hence, S is the ratio a/b, 1/3 0 is the ratio 
c/d, and the areas f and F of the inscribed and circumscribed 
figures respectively are the ratios f and Fr? «
We have:
1) f*<S < Fnf by assumptions 1-4, Sphere and Cylinder, 1#
%) f* < 1/3 C < F¥, by proof, as given on page W 3above#
3) For any J) a ratio r exists such that S — r < cP} , by the 
existence theorem#
4) For any <Px a ratio R exists such that R — S < ̂  , by the 
existence theorem#
5) If S > 1/3 C let J] * 8 -1/3 C and r = ft; then, from (3)
3 - fv,<S - 1/3 C, whence 1/3 C < ft, a contradiction of (2)#
6) If S < 1/3 C let J \  = 1/3 C - 3 and R = F„; then, from (4),
F*- S < 1/5 C —  S, whence Fn < 1/3 C, a contradiction of (2)#
7) From (5) and (6) if follows, by the lemma, that S ^1/3 C,q*e#d,
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And now We may summarize as follows* The measure, a/b, 
of the figure I is, in the first instance, accepted as 
existing, by the simple intuition that to any magnitude 
corresponds a EudoXian ratio as its measure* Then, as the next 
step, sequencesof ratios,
f/ 9 • # * • f»f and P| , * * * * 5Vi
are constructed as measures of inscribed and circumscribed 
figures, respectively, and, by viirtue of assumptions 1 — 4, 
Sphere and Cylinder, 1*, (assumptions which, roughly speaking, 
merely state that a figure contained in another has a measure 
less than that of the other), it is asserted that, for any 
f >̂1 e/b <
Next, it is proved in each case (and is guarante£&for all 
eases by the existence theorem) that the approximations f̂ ,
, can be made as close as is desired, that is, for any cf] ,
, fvi and 2V, exist such that
a) a/b — f-n < cPt
b) - a/b < d i
Then the estimate c/d is produced —  how it is found will 
be considered later —  and it is shown, by special proof in 
each case (and in this one may see a first inadequacy in this 
calculus for, obviously, such a proof could not be of general 
scope) that, for any f*, 2V,
c) f ̂  <: c/d < *
The ratios a/b, c/d are then compared* It is first 
supposed that c/d < a/b and then, by (a), it is deduced that
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for some f»<, the relation a/b- f-̂  < a/b - c/d holds, whence 
o/d < fM, which is false by (c)* Then it is supposed that
a/b < c/d whence, by (b) it is deduced that for so&e F*,,
^ ™ - a/k < c/d - a/b which leads to Fv,<c/d, which is false by 
t c) • From these results,, and the lemma, it is finally deduced 
that a/b =; c/d*
It is clear then that, in this calculus, a/b is not arrived
at as the limit of sequence converging to it either from above
or from below; and it has been shown that such procedures could 
not have been carried out in the Eudoxian number system in which 
this calculus operated* On the other hand, it is equally clear 
that this calculus does make use of approximation sequences, 
either from below, or both from above and from below; and it 
has been shown that for such procedures the Eudoxian number 
system was amply adequate* In the difference between these two 
procedures lies the essential difference between the two
calculi, the ancient and the modem, mentioned earlier in this
\
chapter* The former, starting from a/b, merely constructs one 
or two sequences, always finite, but coming as close to a/b as 
la desired; the latter, starting from (one or) two sequences, 
follows them to their limits, if these exist and, provided they 
are equal, defines a/b as this common value*
It will be noticed, of course, that among the principles 
this calculus depended on Were the logical principles of 
contradiction and of the excluded middle, the Eudoxian axiom, 
and the assumptions 1 - 4 of Archimedes* But what this 
calculus chiefly depended on, in fact, what it seems to have
I l l
been perfectly adapted to,as a method of proof,is the number 
system in which it operated; indeed,for such a number system 
this calculus was a perfect tool. This is not surprising,of 
course,for the same man who created the medium also invented 
the tool to be used in it.
The analysis of the method of exhaustion undertaken here 
has,so far,sought to reveal its nature as a method of proof;it 
is time now to examine it as a method of discovery. How the 
estimate,c/d,was proved to be equal to a/b has been shown; it 
is time to consider the question of how c/d was discovered.
The answer to this question must be looked for,in the 
examples given,in the relations
f Yj < S < ,
f ^ c/d <" W  vi j.
which appeared as the first and second steps in the above 
analysis. It will be recalled that f„and F^also satisfy the 
conditions S - f̂  < £ \  and S < .We examine these 
relations then in the examples presented above and try to 
discover*from the evidence available,how the ratio c/d could 
be (and thus how it.possibly,was) arrived at in each case.
We omit the first example in this examination since the above 
relations do n o t ,strictly,apply to it —  it will be recalled 
that Eudoxus did not use circumscribed figures^, but 
employed a device instead.
In the second example an estimated, of the area,S, of 
the circle is to be found. Let C be the circumference of the
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circle and R its radius* Let be 
the area of an inscribed regular 
polygon of n sides; let p be its 
perimeter9 s its sides and r its 
apothem#
Let Fry, be the area of a circumscribed polygon of m sides; 
let P be its perimeter9 < r its side and R its apothem# Then, 
by assumptions 1 — 4,
(1) p ̂ < S < Pm 9 and
(2) p < 0 < P .
From (2), by multiplying by 1/2 R
1/2 R p < 1/2 R 0 < 1/2 R P , whence
1/2 r p ̂  1/2 R 0 < 1/2 R P , since r < R# From this
(3) ^ l/2 RC ^ P-»>i •
In (3) we have a derivation of the estimate, 1/2 R C, of 
the area of the cirele, with a proof that it is greater than 
p„ , for any n, and less than Pm , for any m# No actual 
summation of parts is necessary; for the inscribed isosceles 
triangles (with apothem r) are seen to form the polygon , 
and the outer ones (with apothem R) the polygon P*̂  #
In the next example, from Archimedes again, an estimate of 
the area, S, of the spiral r = a 0 is to be found# Let the 
figures of areas f^ and F^ be drawn in and about the spiral, 
as on page ' 0 *  above; then, by assumptions 1 — 4,
(l) >̂1 < S < F-vi «
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How, obviously, is the sum of the similar circular
sectors with radii OP, , OP*., * * * * OB*. Since all the
angles about the center, 0, Are equal, these radii form an 
arithmetic progression with common difference OP, • Hence, 
writing k for OPi , we have
©P, = k, OP* = 2k, 0P3 = $k, ♦ ♦ * OPoo = nk*
By squaring and adding now we get
(2) OP* + op/ +■ 0P3V  , . . . +0P^ = k*(a3/3+n*/2 -+■ a/6)>k*n/'3
Again, it is obvious that f* is the sum of the circular
sectors with radii OP, , 0PX , • • ♦ QP„_, * We subtract
OP^ = k2nafrom each side of (2) and get
(3) 0P , V0Pii>- , . . .+ 0pJ-/=k4(n3/ 3 - n V 2  -̂  n/6) < k4n3/3.
The results (2) and (3) above are Archimedes9 Lemma 1 
(page 101 above); they are obtained by him in the manner 
characteristic of the time, that is, by means of geometric 
lines*
Substituting similar sectors now for the squared radii 
—  which is equivalent to multiplying by 0 * ^ / n  —  and 
observing that k = r/n, where r is the radius of the circle, 
we get, from (2)
4) F~i > k z. n3/Z-V/n « ^/3 (r/n)V = 1/3 0,
where C is the area of the circle* In the same way we get 
from (3̂ ,
5) < l/^ C*
(4) (5) may now be combined into
a\ f-v) A 1/3 0 ^ P-v) •
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In (6) we have Archimedes* derivation of the estimate,
1/3 C, of the area of the spiral. In this case a summation of 
a finite series has actually heen performed; the resemblance 
to the modem conception of the integral is a little closer.
The method used by Archimedes in this example is one that 
he has used in other examples also, though by no means in all. 
Its chief characteristic is the summation of a finite series; 
and it is probable that those commentators (Heath, Tannery, 
and others) who haire maintained that Archimedes performs 
integrations, in the modem sense, or passes to the limits of 
sequences, were led into these erroneous beliefs by hasty 
consideration of this characteristic# It is worth-while then 
to contrast to the Archimedean method the following modern 
procedures for obtaining c/d.
First method. Proceeding intuitively, one may, given the 
bounded surface, 3, assert that the area, a/b, unknown as yet, 
exists; then, letting f*, and F^ have meanings as before, 
engage in the following steps of reasoning.
a) t v  4 a/b < F„, by the same assumption as that used by 
Archimedes.
b) L f« ± a/b  ̂L F*, from (a) and the concept of the "limit*.
c) L f - L li - c/d say, by actual evaluation,, 
dj a/b = c/d , from (a) and (c).
There is no conflict with Greek intuition!sm here, but 
concepts are involved which were no part of Greek mathematics. 
The concept of the limit is used in step (b), which implies 
the consideration of an infinite sequence and presupposes a
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continuous number system* Applying this method to the last 
example considered above, and using the same notation, we 
haves
t n < a/b < F*. , whence
a/b ̂  L F~, , that is 
L *7n %  OP? — a/b ̂  L *7a- OP? , 
where f-* and F *, have meanings as before* From relations (2) 
and (3), of page //3 f we get
L n/n  (r/nf (n3/3 - a*/2 n/6) - a/b & $*7n(r/a)* (a3/3 *nV2 *n/6)
from which, by evaluation of the limits,
l/S^r^a/b ^1/5^ r %  that is, a/b ^1/5 C.
Second Method* Discarding the notions and assumptions 
of intuitive geometry employed in the first method (but, it 
may be observed, still following the path pointed out by 
intuition) one may, more strictly, and on a purely arithmetic 
basis,
a) Prove that L f^ , L exist,
b) Prove that L f = L F^ ,
c) Evaluate this limit, to obtain c/d say,
d) Define the area as c/d*
In this procedure the same concepts, foreign to Greek 
thought, are involved; but in addition there is direct conflict 
with Greek intuitionism. To the Greek mind an area did not 
exist merely by virtue of a definition*
The point need not be labored further; it is established 
I think, that the calculus of Eudoxus and Archimedes, as 
formally presented at least, is strictly finite in character*
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But#, as will be shown presently, Archimedes did use, 
heuristically and quite apart from the Method of Exhaustion, 
concepts beyond the finite. In preliminary Investigations 
of some theorems he made use, purely as means to discovery, 
of processes which were essentially summations of infinite 
sequences of infinitely small elements*
These processes are contained in the famous ,,Method,, of 
101Archimedes, given to the world by Heiberg, following his 
discovery, in Constantinople, of the manuscript relating 
thereto, in 1906*
We find, in the letter to Eratosthenes, prefixed to this 
book, the following comment, by Archimedes, on this method*
*1 thought fit to write out for you and explain in detail in the same book the peculi­arity of a certain method, by which it will be possible for you to get a start to enable you 
to investigate some of the problems in mathe­matics by means of mechanics* This procedure is,I am persuaded, no less useful even for the proof of the theorems themselves; for certain things first became clear to me by a mechanical method, although they had to be demonstrated by geometry aterwards because their investigation by this method did not furnish an actual demonstration*.
Archimedes applies this method to two problems in this 
book: the evaluation of the area of a segment of a parabola and 
the evaluation of the volume of a sphere* Since the treatment 
of these problems is the same, it will be enough to consider 
only one in this survey, say that on the volume of the sphere*
Having stated, in his customary careful way, the propo­
sitions which he assumes (these are, in this case, propositions 
from his book On the Equilibrium of Planes), and having first
101 Heath, The Method of Archimedes, treating of Mechanical problems, Cambridge, jlvJÎ *
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dealt with the segment of the parabola , Archimedes then 
proceeds to "investigate", by this method, the proposition that
Any sphere is, in respect of solid content, four times the cone with base equal to a great circle of the sphere and height equal to its radius*
This investigation (rendered here in Archimedes' own style, 
as translated by Heath) proceeds thus;
Let ABCD be a great circle of a 
sphere, and AC, BD diameters at right 
angles to one another* Let a circle H
be drawn about BD as diameter and in a 
plane perpendicular to AC, and on this 
circle as base let a cone be described 
with A as vertex# Let the 
surface of this cone be 
produced and then cut by 
a plane through C parallel 
to its base; the section 
will be a circle on EF as 
diameter* On this circle
as base let a cylinder be erected with height and axis AC, and 
produce CA to K, making AH equal to AC*
Let GH be regarded as the bar of a balance, A being its
middle point*
Draw any straight line, MN, in the plane of the circle 
ABCD, and parallel to BD* Let MN meet the circle in 0, P,
the diameter AC in S, and the straight lines AE, AF in Q,R, ^
respectively# Join AO.
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Through MN draw a plane at right angles to AC; this plane 
will cnt the cylinder in a circle with diameter MN, the sphere 
in a circle with diameter OP, and the cone in a circle with 
diameter QH#
Now, since MS = AC, and QS - AS,MS . Sft = CA - AS
= A02 „= OS * Sft
and,since HA - AC
HA ; AS = CA ; AS = MS i Sft - MB : ' Sft-MS ; (OS2 +■ SQ* ), from the above result= MN i (0PZ + QB?); hence
HA AS = (circle on diameter MN) : (circle on diameter OP ■/-
circle on diameter QE),
that is
HA : AS = (eircle in cylinder) ' (circle in sphere -h circle in cone),
Therefore the circle in the cylinder, placed where it is,
is in equilibrium, about A, with the circle in the sphere
together with the circle in the cone, if both the latter cireles 
are placed with their centers of gravity at H.
Similarly for amy three corresponding sections made by a 
plane perpendicular to AO and passing through any other straight 
line in the parallelogram LF parallel to EF.
If we deal in the same way with all the sets of three 
ciroles in which planes perpendicular to AO cut the cylinder, 
the sphere, and the cone, and which make up those solids
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respectively, it follows that the cylinder, in the place where 
it is, will be in equilibrium about A with the sphere and the
cone together, when both are placed with their centers of
gravity at H.
Therefore, since K is the center of gravity of the 
cylinder,
HA ; A£ = (cylinder) ; (sphere + cone AEF)
But HA = 2AK; therefore
cylinder =s Z (sphere -+■ cone AEF} •
Now, cylinder ^ 3 (cone AEF), by Euclid XII, 10;
therefore, cone AEF = Z  (sphere)*
But, since EF = 2 BD,
cone AEF = B (cone ABD); therefore
sphere -4 (cone ABD), q#e*d*
In Proposition 34, On the Sphere and Cylinder, Archimedes 
proves, by the method of exhaustion and, apparently, quite 
independently of the above investigation, that the estimate,
4 (cone ABD), is the true volume of the sphere; but he says, 
elsewhere in the preface to "The Method", that,
"It is of course easier, when we have previously acquired, by the Method, some Knowledge of the questions, to supply the proof than it is to find it without any previous 
Knowledge"*
It is clear that in this example of Archimedes* Method 
(see underscored lines) a solid is thought of as the sum of an 
infinity of infinitely small elements* Now, we have seen that 
Pythagoras had taught that from lines come planes, and
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from these solid figures, etc.**, and that Democritus had 
thought of the cone and the cylinder as being composed of 
circles; we have also seen that Archimedes was notjaoquainted 
with these views. It is probable then that in these views lies 
the source of this conception of the solid exhibited by Archi­
medes in his Method. For, not only does his mention of 
Democritus, and his theorem, in shch close connection with his 
Method strongly suggest it, but we also have the following 
indirect evidence. His statement that Eudoxus gave the first 
* irrefragable” proof of the theorem implies that he knew of 
other, refragable, proofs. One such proof, that he knew of, 
was that of Democritus. It is true that he does not say that 
Democritus* proof was refragable, but only that "he did not 
prove it (the theorem)w, but this simply means that he did 
not consider Democritus * proof good enough* For he also says, 
about his own method, which is similar to that of Democritus*, 
that it does not supply a proof but rather "a sort of 
indication that the conclusion is true".
For still other methods employed by Archimedes for 
obtaining an estimate of a geometric magnitude which he wished 
to evaluate, we examine the following, very revealing state­
ment, which forms the last paragraph of ^he Method.
"From this theorem, to the effect that a sphere is four times as great as the cone with & great circle of the sphere as base and with height equal to the radius of the sphere, I conceived the notion that the surface of any sphere is four times 
as great as a circle in it; for, judging fromthe fact that any circle is equal to a triangle with base equal to the circumference and height equal 
to the radius of the circle, I apprehended that, in 
like manner, any sphere is equal to a cone with base
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equal to tlie surface of the sphere and height equal to the radius”*
To make the meaning of this passage clearer, let r, C,A, 
be the radius, circumference and area, respectively, of a 
great circle of the sphere, and let S and V be the area and 
volume, respectively, of the sphere itself* We have seen 
that Archimedes proved (Prop* 1, Measurement of a Circle) 
that:
1) A = 1/2 . r ■ C
and (Prop* 34, On the Sphere and Cylinder) that
«) V ~ 4 * 1/5 • r • A
The passage quoted says now that " judging” from (1) 
Archimedes "apprehended* that, "in like manner?,
5) V = 1/5 ‘ r * S
and, from (2) and (5), that he "conceived the notion that"
4) S ~ 4 ’ A*
This estimate he proved, in the usual manner, in Prop* 55, 
Gn the Sphere and Cylinder, to be the true area of the sphere* 
But of greater interest than the derivation of the estimate 
S = 4 ' A is the derivation of the estimate V = 1/3 * r ■ S 
by analogy from A = 1/2 r * C* The analogy involved is, very 
probably, the one exhibited in the figures below.
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C
A A = 4 v - f r A S
/. V = 2T4V=
In the derivation of this estimate also a solid is 
conceived as the sum of an infinity of infinitely small elements. 
Two differences from the previous example are to be noted! 
the infinitely small elements are not plane sections this 
time, further, the summation is more direct; the laws of 
equilibrium are not needed.
And now we can state, in summary, that the method of 
exhaustion, as a method of discovery, did not make use of a 
general method, but depended rather, according to the problem 
being considered at the time,
a) on direct intuition, as in the case of the circle 
(A s l/2 «r • 0),
b) or on the summation of a finite series, as in the case of 
the spiral (S =1/31),
c) or on the "method of sections", assisted by the laws of 
equilibrium, as in the case of the sphere (V =  4 l/Sr-A),
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d) or on an intuitive summation of infinitesimals, some times 
suggested by analogy, as in the ease of the sphere (seeond 
estimate, V ^ 1/3-r S ) ,
e) or on an algebraic deduction, as in the ease of the area 
of the sphere, (S — 4 - A) ♦
The lack of a general method of discovery limited the 
applicability of this method| its successful use in any given 
ease was more a matter of ingenuity on the part of the 
investigator than an application of a standard method. 
Nevertheless, this method remained in existence, in the form 
in which Archimedes left it, for almost two thousand years, as 
the chief tool of mathematics within the field of its 
applicability. It was used again* by Pappus (c.380 A.D.), was 
preserved in the East in the works of Ibn Al-Haitam (died 1039), 
it spread in Europe, principally through the translations of 
Archimedes that began to appear at about the middle of the 
fifteenth century, was used by Galileo (c* 1650), a little 
later by Gregory St. Vincent (c. 165Q), and was finally super­
seded by the methods of Kepler, Guldin and Gavalieri.
It Is to be noted, however, that these new methods only 
abandoned the method of exhaustion as a method of proof, thus 
losing much in the matter of rigor; they retained its concepts 
and processes as a method of discovery. Kepler made wide use 
of the ancient Greek conception of the solid as composed of an 
infinity of planes, and the plane of an infinity of lines; 
in particular, "he conceived the circle to be composed of an 
infinite ndmber of triangles having their common vertices at
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the center and their bases in the circumference; and the
102sphere to consist of an infinite number of pyramids19! 
which, as has been seen, was the Archimedean conception also* 
Again, it is well known that Cavalieri9s method, which made 
use of similar concepts, was prompted by that of Kepler*s, 
and as to that of Gruldin9s^03, which obtained volumes by the 
use of these concepts and that of the center of gravity, we 
have seen it already forecast in The Method of Archimedes*
102 Gajori, History of Mathematics, p* 160
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APPENDIX I 
TEE "MESOLABE" QP ERATOSTHENES
1Eatocius (in his commentary on Archimedes* On the Sphere
and Cylinder) mentions a **votive monument** erected hy Eratos-
* 2 thenes of Gyrene (b. 276 B#C#) to Ptolemy on which was fixed
a representation in bronze of his mechanical contrivance for
solving the problem of the two geometric means, and on which
appeared also a short proof and an epigram, the epigram
stating, among other things, that the same contrivance would
equally well serve to interpolate any desired number of means
between the two lines*
3In Book III, Prop# 5, Pappus gives the following 
description of this contrivance#
"Let AB rA be a rigid rectangle and in it three.equal triangles, AEP, MZK, NKA , the one,AEP, fixed in position, the other two, MZK, NHA , 
free to slide along AB#
1 Heath, History of Greek Mathematics, vol# 2
^ Ptolemy Suergetes who, about 246 B*C# had called 
Eratosthenes to Alexandria to be a tutor to his song and 
superintendent of the library#
3 Ver# Eecke, loc# clt#
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Cut off A ~ equal to one half of AT and slide the triangles MZK, WLA until the points A, Tf ,
0, Q are on the same straight line* Then fl P,OK are the means sought11 •
It willbe seen that the contrivance solves the problem 
of the duplication of the cube; but Pappus observes that "If 
the ratio of cdbe to cube is some other, then the ratio of AT 
to must be made equal to this other”. Prom this remark 
and the epigram stated by Eutocius it is clear that the 
"Mesolab# was capable of solving the more general problem
tf . rtx =r k a *
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APPENDIX II 
MR. ABR. EDEL’S THESIS
Aristotle recognizes, explicitly* two kinds of potenti­
ality. There is first the potentiality of activity, as in 
seeing. One sees potentially (i.e., one is ahle to see) and 
one sees actually. And after one has seen, actually, nothing 
has changed in him in respect Of this potentiality. Then there 
is the potentiality corresponding to change. lor example, the 
stone is potentially a statue; but after the stone has once 
become a statue it does not revert to its former state in 
respect to that potentiality.
However, says Mr. Edel, there is still another kind of 
potentiality, about which Aristotle is not explicit but which 
there is ample evidence to believe he did consider, and that 
is the potentiality that corresponds to repeated change. 
Aristotle considers that a thing is potentially some thing else 
when, irnder certain circumstances, the latter will result 
through some single process or activity in which the former 
Is engaged. But if several processes or activities are necessary 
(as earth becoming bronze, bronze a etatue), one cannot speak 
of the one as being, potentially, the other. Thus, this 
potentiality is applicable to cases in which the actuality is 
obtainable in one step. Yet, if in a series of events 
involving a repeated change ( and where potentiality cannot 
be said to reside in the individual terms of the series), if
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in such, a series there exists a subject involved in the change, 
or several interrelated subjects, which constitute a condition, 
or set of conditions, for the repetition of the process (and 
therefore the successive terms of the series) then there be 
said (Mr, Mel said it, so did Kant, but did Aristotle?) to be 
a potentiality, residing not in the individual terms, but in the 
subject which serves as a condition for any term, after the 
previous one has been actualized, This, Mr, Mel maintains, is 
the potentiality that characterizes Aristotle's "potential1* 
infinite.
The strength of Mr, Mel's argument lies especially in the 
examples he has selected from Aristotle, These are: day, the 
Olympic Games, the generations of men, the division of magni­
tudes, For, any day follows Inevitably, after an interval, 
from the very same system of conditions which caused the previous 
one; any celebration of the Olympic games from the same complex 
of Greek religious beliefs which produced the previous one, any 
generation of men follows the previous one by the action of the 
same faculties of human nature which produced the previous one, 
and any division of magnitude follows the previous one through 
the same conditions (the divisibility of magnitude, the will of 
the divider to divide, etc,) which caused the previous one.
Stated more abstractly, what Mr, Mel says is that the 
continued repetition of a process, occurring in a medium vfcieh 
can guarantee that after any step another can be taken, is an 
actualization which is always going on but in never complete, 
but that the corresponding potentiality is a complete whole
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and that this potentiality underlies Aristotle’s infinite#
If this is Aristotle*s conception of the infinite (and 
Mr# Mel admits that he has not found an explicit statement 
of it in Aristotle’s works) , then,clearly Aristotle is the 
fore-runner of the Peano, Frege, Cantor, Hassell school which 
derives the infinite hy the principle of mathematical induction# 
Cantor does not make explicit use of this principle, but he 
uses it nevertheless# Bussell, with more philosophic 
penetration, has singled it out and made it the basis of his 
''inductive number”. It is true that Dedekind defined the 
infinite by another of its properties * namely, that of having 
a part equal to itself# But this is an unordered infinite#
To reduce it to the ordered kind, Zexmelo’s axiom is needed# 




m i  SERIES OF EtJDOXXAN RATIOS
We recall Euclid's definitions 5 and 7:
Def • 5* a A  == c/d if, for every pair m, n, ma f  nb according
as me p nd*
Def* 7* a/b > c/d if, for some pair, m, n, ma > nb but mc<nd,
and prove, in succession,
A* If a/b — c/d then c/d ^ a/b*
For, if me < nd then ma < nb,if me = nd then ma = nb,
if me ^ nd then ma "> nb,
since the assumption that any of these conditions is not satis­
fied leads to a contradiction of the hypothesis a/b e/d; 
hence, by Def* 5, e/d = a/b*
B* If a/b = e/d and c/d = e/f then a/b — e/f.
For, if ma fr nb according as me 0  nd, and me $ nd
according gs me 0 nf then ma 0 nb according as me ^ nf;
hence, by Def* 5, a/b ^ e/f*
0* If a/b > c/d then a/b =*= e/d.
This follows from the incompatibility of definitions 5
and 7*
D * If a/b :> c/d then e/d a/b,
For the same reason as in C* above*
If a/b > c/d then e/d a/b*
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Por , since a/b >- c/d then, for some m, n,
1: ma > nb but me < nd , by Def • 7#
If possible, let c/d > a/b, then, for some / *  , y ,
2: /<c > v d  but f t a ^ j'b, by Def. 7*
We prove 1; and 2: incompatible, let ^  = (r/s)m and ^ -  
(p/<l)n; then, by substituting in 2:
3: qxmc > spnd but qrma ^ spnb.
Also, from Is by multiplication by qr,
4s qrma > qrnb but qrmc ^ qrnd.
Now from the first of 3: and the second of 4:
5: qrnd > spnd whence qr > sp.
Also, from the second of 3: and the first of 4;
6: spnb > qrnb whence sp > qr.
But the results 5: and 6: are contradictory. Hence the 
theorem is true.
P. Definition, c/d is said to be "less than* a/b (a relation
here indicated thus: c/d < a/b), if a/b > c/d.
This definition is justified by the results C., D*, E.,
above* This definition is not given explicitly in Book Y, but
the relation *less than* is used there precisely in the sense 
of this definition.
a. If, for same m, n, ma < nb but me ^ nd then a/b < c/d. 
This follows from Def. 7* and P above.
H. Of the relations a/b -< c/d, a/b *= c/d, a/b > c/d only
one can hold.
Por, from C., D., E., P., it follows that these relations 
are mutually incompatible.
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I. Of the relations a/b < c/d, a/b = c/d, a/b > c/d one 
must hold.
For, given any two ratios, a/b and c/d, the criterion
of equality, ma f nb according as me $ nd, for any m, n,
either is or is not satisfied* If it is, then a/b =: c/d and
the theorem holds* If it is not, then it fails for one of the
following three reasons:
1: for some m9 n, ma < nb but me w nd, or2: for some m, n, ma ̂ nb but me $ nd, or3: for some m, n, ma ̂ nb but me 4 nd,
since, from (3) of p, above, we have that any two magnitudes
of the same kind, ma and nb, must satisfy one and only one of
the relations ma < nb, ma - nb, ma > nb, and the three reasons
given above contain all the logical possibilities*
If ease 1: occurs then a/b < c/d, by G* above*
If case 2: occurs in the form ma = nb but me > nd then
c/d ;> a/b, by Def* 7* But if it occurs in the f om ma = nb
but me < nd then c/d < a/b, by G*
If case 3: occurs then a/b > c/d, by Def* 7*
Hence, under any circumstances, the theorem holds*
J. If a/b > c/d and c/d > e/f then a/b > e/f *
From the hypothesis and Def* 7, we have:
a) for some m, n, ma > nb but me < nd, and
b) for some $ y $ c > vd but f t  e v t *
Let = (r/s)m and p ~ Cp/q)n and substitute in b); 
we get:
c) qxmc > spnd but qrme £ spnf *
Also, from a), by multiplication by qr,
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6) qrma ,> qrnb but qrmc = qmd*
Now, from the first of c) and the second of d),
e) spnd < qrnd, whence sp < qr#
Substituting from e) in the second of c),
f) qrme ^ spnf < qraf, whence me < nf •
We have then, from a), that ma > nb, and from f), that 
me < nf; hence, by Def. 7., a/b > e/f, which was to be shown*
K. The class of Eudoxian ratios, ordered by the relation "less
than", as defined, is a series.
For
a) If a/b, c/d are any two distinct ratios, then either
a/b < c/d or c/d < a/b, by H and I above*
b) If a A  < c/d then a/b^ c/d, by D* above*
c) If a/b < c/d and c/d < e/f then a/b < e/f , by J. above.
L. The series of Eudoxian ratios is dense*
Let a/b < c/d, where a, b, c, d are magnitudes of the
same kind, and let u be the unit of magnitude* We show that 
there exists a ratio, f/g, such that a/b < f/g < c/d.
Since a/b < c/d then, by Def. 7., for some m, n, cm > nd
but ma < nb# Now since me > nd, me — nd is a Eudoxian 
magnitude of the same kind as c and d; of course, so is md. 
Therefore, by the Eudoxian axiom, an integer k exists such 
that k(me — nd) > md; from the last result we deduce
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^ § ~~ m * 1,d:lence 
n/m -h l/k < c/d# We have then,
a ~ au < (to -*- m)n cb ^ mu kmu ct
We take f = (kn m)u, g 1= kmu# For s$ch an f and g, 
a/b < f/g < c/d, which was to be shown#
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APPENDIX IV
The problem of the Pappus-Guldin theorem has long been a
source of vexation* In the advance notice of Book 7 of Pappusf
Mathematical Collection one finds the statement that
The ratio of perfect solids created by the revolution of plane areas about an axis in their plane consists of the ratio of the revolved areas and that of the straights similarly drawn from the bar$centric points situated in these planes to the axis; and the ratio of imperfect solids created by 
the revolution of plane areas about an external axis in their planes is composed of the ratio of the plane areas and that of the arcs described by the bary- centric points situated in these planes*
with the additional information that ”a great many other
theorems of this kind had been proved" ♦ One is naturally led
to believe that somewhere in Book 7 one will find this theorem,
or some problem bearing on it, dealt with in some way* For it
was a practice of Pappus, consistently observed throughout the
Mathematical Collection, to introduce in the first few pages
of each book the subjects to be treated therein* One is
puzzled therefore to find that the theorem, or problem bearing
on it, is not even mentioned in Book 7, or anywhere else in the
entire Mathematical Collection*
1 2Ver Eecke thinks (and states that F* Hultsch is of the
some opinion) that the passage in question is an interpolation* 
He bases his belief not only on the peculiar, isolated
Ver Eeoke, on* cit
2 Fr* Hultsch, Pauni Alexandria! uollectionls Berlin,
1876-78.
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appearance of the passage in the Mathematical Collection but 
also on the following considerations*
1:- The language in which the passage is eouehed is less pure, and less clear, than that of therest of the book and contains words nowhereelse used in it;
2s- The first editions of the Mathematical Collection in Europe (Commandinus, Pisa, 1588; reprinted,Venice, 1589; Pisa, 1602) do not contain this passage, but the next one (a revised edition of Commandinus1, put out by C. Manolessius, 1660 Bologna) does*
It is clear that this evidence effectively disposes of 
Pappus as the author of the theorem in question; and it is
equally clear that it also settles the question as to whether
Guldin borrowed his theorem from the Mathematical Collection 
or not, for the date of his death (1645) precludes the 
possibility of his having even seen the Manolessius edition*
But Ver Eecke rather spoils this otherwise sound, though 
partial solution of the Pappus-Guldin problem by an apparent 
willingness to believe in "the remarkable fact that some quite 
eminent geometer lived and wrote, after Pappus, in the period 
of decadence1*, and by stating that Guldin must be given credit 
for a genuine "rediscovery* (sic)* Having shown that GuMin 
could not have obtained his theorem from the Mathematical 
flollection he rejects, or does not consider, the converse 
possibility of Guldin1 s theorem finding its way into the 
Mathematical Collection* And yet much can be said in support 
of such a view*
Guldin1 s entrobarvca. in which the theorem in question
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is first stated| and used to evaluate a good many volumes of
revolution, appeared many years before the Manolessius
edition* Kepler1 s Nova Stereometria Dpi 1 orum; aceessit stereo-
metriae Arehimideae supulementum (1615) , in which similar
problems are solved (though by a different method), and
Oavalieri *s Geometric indivisibilibus (1635), in which
like problems again are dealt with, had already made their
appearance* Above all, the long and bitter dispute between
Guldin and Oavalieri, in which each attacked the method of the
other and neither could adequately defend his own had, long
since, flared up, raged on for years, and ended after the death
of both opponents (Oavalieri1 s in 1647)* Manolessius certainly
had had time, and opportunity, to learn not only of Guldin1 s
theorem but also of the "great many other theorems of this
kind" that had been proved* ffiiat he was also not incapable of
making illicit entries in his revision of Commandinus* edition
3is attested by Ver Eecke, by Hultsch and by Heath • It follows 
then that the hypothetical "eminent geometer, after Pappus, in 
the period of decadence" must be rejected* Por not only is 
there no record, or even hint, of the existence of such a person 
in all history but, since the explanation suggested above is 
so much more probable, there is even no necessity for the 
hypothesis of his existence*
It is almost certain then that the theorem in question, 
in the form currently met with, is due to Guldin; yet the 
discovery is not entirely his*
3 Heath, "Pappus", Bnoyolopoedia Brltaanioa* Werner Ed*
Uew York, 1900, Vol* XVIII, p* 231*
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It is well known that Guldin had been, for a considerable 
time, in close association with Kepler, as an understudy, 
before succeeding him to the chair of Astronomy at the 
gymnasium of Gratis; and, as is also well known, Kepler, the 
more eminent of the two mathematicians, had also occupied him­
self with similar problems* It is not suggested here that 
Guldin obtained his discovery from Kepler —  there is no record 
of such a charge against Guldin —  but it is suggested that 
both Kepler and Guldin, probably at this time, had had access 
to some copy of Archimedes1 Method* For it cannot be by mere 
coincidence that the long-forgotten and until then unused ideas 
of Archimedes all of a sudden reappear in mathematical 
investigations, at about the same time, in the works of Kepler 
and Guldin* It has been shown (Ghap* XII supra) that Kepler1 s 
division of the areas of the cirdle and the sphere into 
infinitesimal elements is, word-for-word, that of Archimedes; 
and it is generally known, of course, that Archimedes was the 
first to use the center of gravity in the evaluation of 
volumes and areas*
